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Introduction 
 
The article will provide the first comprehensive mapping-out exercise of the legal nature and 
character of Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) as bilateral instruments utilised by the 
ECB to establish frameworks for exchange of information, policy dialogue and cooperation, 
or financial assistance. We will provide, in particular, a critical analysis of the nature, 
inherent characteristics, and legal effects of MoUs signed between the ECB and third parties, 
including EU Member States’ and third countries’ authorities. Given the steady reliance of 
the ECB since its inception, on such instruments, this article aims to inform current literature 
on the practices of the ECB in this area and especially in the field of banking supervision. 
The paper also aims to feed more broadly into current discourses on the impact of ‘soft law’ – 
encompassing non-binding rules that enjoy special legal relevance. Inter alia, it will inform 
current scholarship on the democratic oversight of EU soft law as well as its impact upon 
Member States’ practices, inclusive of adjudicatory avenues available in case of dispute.  
 
In the last few years, EU institutions and bodies are increasingly using instruments that do not 
conform to our traditional understanding of ‘typical EU acts’, namely those acts found in 
Article 288 TFEU.2 These instruments can broadly be characterised as ‘atypical acts’ of EU 
institutions and bodies and include Commission Communications, information notes, Council 
Conclusions, Resolutions, Declarations and, notably for our purposes, Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoUs).3 Legal scholarship has been using the term ‘soft law’ to refer to such 
instruments, alluring to their alleged lack of binding force.4 Inevitably, the increased use of 
these ‘atypical’ instruments has created questions about their legal effects. As regards MoUs, 
pertinent questions concern: i) the credibility of inter partes dispute resolution under an MoU 
vis-a-vis the enforcement of obligations under the respective Memorandum; and ii) the 
susceptibility of an MoU to external review by the CJEU. The latter is also important in 
                                                
1 School of Law, University of Essex. This paper has been prepared by the authors under the Legal Research 
Programme sponsored by the ECB. Any views expressed are only those of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the views of the ECB or the Eurosystem. We wish to thank the Directorate General Legal Services of 
the ECB and Dr Menelaos Markakis for their useful comments. All mistakes are ours only.  
2 To use the categorisation of Advocate General (AG) Bobek, ‘typical acts’ are those included in Article 288 
TFEU: regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. AG Bobek Opinion in Case C-16/16 
Belgium v Commission [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:959 
3 AG Bobek Opinion in Case C-16/16 Belgium v Commission [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:959, R. Wessel, ‘Soft’ 
International Agreements in EU External Relations: Pragmatism over Principles? ECPR SGEU Conference, 
Panel Hard and Soft Law in the European Union, Paris 13-15 June 2018. 
4 R. Wessel, ‘Soft’ International Agreements in EU External Relations: Pragmatism over Principles? ECPR 
SGEU Conference, Panel Hard and Soft Law in the European Union, Paris 13-15 June 2018, P.L. Lancos ‘A 
Hard Core Under the Soft Shell: How Binding Is Union Soft Law for Member States?’ 2018(4) EPL 755. 
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relation to demarcating/establishing the competence of the CJEU to hear individual 
complaints of alleged rights violations taking place under an MoU. As we will discuss, cases 
before the CJEU include questions on whether decisions authorising the signing of non-
binding agreements can be challenged under Article 263 TFEU on grounds of institutional 
competence. This line of case law is particularly relevant from an access to justice point of 
view - especially the participation of the citizen in potential judicial review proceedings 
against EU Institutions such as the ECB.5   
 
The ultimate aim of the article is to fill existing silences in the literature on MoUs with regard 
to the signing, mutual obligations and liability that MoUs create.6 Although resort to these 
instruments has so far attracted the attention of scholars in fields such as EU competition 
law,7 and external relations,8 it has been less explored in the area of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) and even less so with regard to the ECB.9 Within the field of EMU, legal 
scholars have primarily focused on examining MoUs in the context of financial assistance 
given to Eurozone Member States vis-a-vis the Euro area sovereign debt crisis.10 Although 
financial assistance forms an essential component of any study on MoUs, this article 
distinguishes itself from previous work in the field by looking beyond the use of MoUs 
during the EU financial crisis. We focus on the use of MoUs more broadly as instruments 
used by the ECB from its establishment in 1997, until the present day, and with reference to 
monetary policy and banking supervision.   
 
The article will commence in Part I by deciphering the definition and application of MoUs as 
atypical acts while also challenging the assumption that they should be conveniently defined 
as instruments of ‘soft law’. In this respect we explore the legal status of MoUs under EU and 
international law, and more broadly the legally binding nature and judicial control over non-
legal positions and commitments, often described as EU soft law. We do so while also 
pointing to definitional grey areas with regard to the obligations that MoUs impose to the 
signatory parties, and the possibility of challenging or modifying their content.  
                                                
5 See T. Konstadinides, The Rule of Law: The Internal Dimension (Hart Publishing, 2017), Chapters 1, 2. 
6 The lack of scholarly attention to so-called ‘soft-law’ instruments has been noted in the literature.   Senden 
also notes a lack of scholarly attention on what she names ‘soft postlegislative rulemaking’, i.e. the use of soft 
law instruments (e.g. communications, notices, codes) by the Commission when it comes to further 
implementing EU law. L Senden ‘Soft Post-Legislative Rulemaking: A Time for More Stringent Control’ 
(2013) 19(1) ELJ 57. 
7 O. Stefan, ‘European Union Soft Law: New Developments Concerning the Divide between Legally Binding 
Force and Legal Effects (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 879-893.  
8 R. Wessel, ‘Soft’ International Agreements in EU External Relations: Pragmatism over Principles? ECPR 
SGEU Conference, Panel Hard and Soft Law in the European Union, Paris 13-15 June 2018. 
9 Academic discussions have taken place more broadly with regard to the non-binding powers and tasks of the 
bodies involved in the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), namely the European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). For some examples see M Busuioc, ‘Rule-
Making by the European Financial Supervisory Authorities: Walking a Tight Rope’ (2013) 19(1) ELJ 111; E 
Ferran, K Alexander, ‘Can soft law bodies be effective? The special case of the European Systemic Risk Board’ 
(2010) 35(6) ELRev 751. 
10 See C Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
Hinarejos, The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective’ (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015); E 
Nanopoulos & F Vergis, The Euro-Crisis as a Multi-Dimensional Systemic Crisis of the EU’ (2018, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press). 
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We contend that MoUs are incapable of being conclusively defined. This is because the 
several terms of an overarching definition (e.g. soft law) may lack certain MoU attributes 
inherent in another definition (e.g. atypical acts; legal acts) which can be complementary to 
our assessment of their legal character and nature. What is more, there is no universal 
definition of the concept of soft law. The best, and as we contend, the only way of making 
them understood is to examine their mandatory or permissive wording/drafting; taxonomise 
them according to the legal obligations (if any) that flow from them and draw some empirical 
insights of their use in practice. When it comes to the MoUs signed by the ECB in particular, 
we also need to take into account the confidential nature of some of them: with some MoUs 
not being made public, any attempt to produce an all-encompassing definition is bound to be 
weak. Following a critical review of the current literature and the case law of the CJEU as to 
the legal status of MoUs we undertake in Part II an empirical analysis of publicly available 
MoUs signed by the ECB from the early stages of the EMU up until the latest relevant 
developments on the Banking Union.11 This Part depicts, for instance, the evolution of the 
use of MoUs and common characteristics between them. 12  
  
Based on the above considerations, Part III of the article will attempt to establish a legal 
framework that can assist our understanding of the nature, operation, and legal consequences 
of MoUs signed by the ECB. For this purpose we will examine whether the various MoUs 
discussed in Part II should be given a homogeneous interpretation, or whether the exercise of 
discerning their legal character should rely on a test based on their aims and/or the parties 
involved. We finally draw some lessons about the drafting of MoUs signed by the ECB, as 
well as the potential for litigation that may arise from their use in the event of disagreement 
between the signatory parties or in cases where one party does not honour the terms of an 
MoU. 
 
Overall, the paper offers a novel understanding of the nature and role of MoUs involving the 
ECB by critically evaluating relevant legal doctrine, the case law of EU Courts, and the 
ECB’s institutional practice.  The analysis comes at a pertinent time. Although the ECB has 
been involved in the negotiation and conclusion of MoUs since the early years of its 
establishment, the use of these instruments has increased with the establishment of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The transfer of new supervisory tasks to the ECB, as well as 
its central role within the SSM which requires a high level of cooperation between the ECB 
and national supervisory authorities, has increased the use of MoUs as ‘cooperation 
tools’.13As evidenced by the latest (2017) ECB Annual Report on Supervisory Activities, this 
trend will continue. According to the Report, the ECB has joined some of the existing MoUs 
that were agreed between euro area National Competent Authorities (NCAs) and third 
                                                
11 Annex I of this paper provides a database of the publicly available MoUs involving the ECB - in full text or 
only in Press Release form. The Annex provides online links where the reader is directed for further details and 
information about each MoU.  
12 Please note that some of these MoUs are confidential and thus the only available data about them are the ECB 
Press Releases announcing their signature. Others are only mentioned in the ECB Annual Supervisory Reports, 
without any other information publicly available as to their content. See Section II for more details on this point.   
13 See the 2017 ECB Annual Supervisory Report. 
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country supervisory authorities before the establishment of the SSM.  The plan is that over 
time the ECB will conclude its own MoUs with third country supervisory authorities so that it 
does not have to rely on existing MoUs. Moreover, EU legislation on banking supervision 
requires the ECB to enter into MoUs with NCAs of Member States and of non-euro area 
Member States, especially those of countries that are home to at least one global systemically 
important institution.14 The ECB also continues using MoUs in areas beyond banking 
supervision: the past three years have seen new MoUs in the field of statistics, exchange of 
information, and relations with third countries.15 
 
It, therefore, transpires that the use of MoUs will not only continue in the years to come but it 
may also increase in the area of financial supervision. Against this background, this 
contribution seeks to offer a framework for addressing the broad range of opportunities 
associated with MoUs in general and the legal challenges that lie ahead with regard to their 
definition and resort by the ECB. It is our intention that some of our conclusions will be able 
to guide others and used in future discussions on resort to EU atypical acts by other EU 
Institutions. 
 
I. Are MoUs instruments of soft law? 
 
As explained, this article has been written in the context of the increased presence of EU 
Institutions, and the ECB in particular, in signing atypical acts  with third parties. Although 
MoUs are often perceived as such, their scope and extent (in determining for example 
whether parties are obliged to carry out the provisions of an MoU or break off negotiations at 
any time) is rather uncertain. For example, the often non-mandatory style of their wording, 
their habitual conclusion between EU Institutions such as the ECB and non-Member State 
authorities as well as the usual absence of registration with the EU give a strong presumption 
of something less than primary or secondary legislative. Defining the legal character of MoUs 
has indeed produced challenges for the EU Institutions concerned as well as opportunities for 
clarification of the breadth of the scope of EU law in this quasi-legal context. The limited 
case law of the CJEU in this particular context (i.e. the use of MoUs by EU institutions) does 
not offer a comprehensive definition or categorisation of these instruments and their 
corresponding effects for the involved parties.  
 
As we will see below, disputes pertaining to MoUs that have so far found their way before 
the CJEU frequently explore questions that have been asked in the context of other cases 
appearing before the same Court concerning non-legally binding instruments.16 Judicial 
                                                
14 Article 3 and Article 8 of the SSM Regulation; 2014 ECB Annual Supervisory Report page 26. 
15 MoU between the ECB and Banco Central do Brasil (April 2016), MoU between Eurostat and the ECB on the 
quality assurance of statistics underlying the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (November 2016), MoU 
between the ECB and the US Office for Financial Research (May 2017), and MoU between the ECB and the 
South African Reserve Bank (March 2018). 
16 Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P Mallis v Commission and ECB[2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:702; Joined 
Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising v Commission and ECB [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:701; Case C-
258/14, Florescu v Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Sibiu, [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:448; Case C-64/16 Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:395. See for an analysis of these 
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responses to such questions have surpassed the permissible limits prescribed by the EU 
Treaties, inter alia, on grounds of institutional competence. This is an important development 
given that the recent use of MoUs in financial assistance programmes has brought to the 
surface pertinent questions regarding the MoUs’ legal status, justiciability and liability which 
relates to the degree of the involvement of EU Institutions in the negotiation and signing of 
these MoUs.  
  
The purpose of this section is to contextualise MoUs and provide some preliminary findings 
about their character and nature, as well as identify impending issues and concerns pertaining 
to their use. In particular, this section asks whether it is accurate to characterise MoUs as ‘soft 
law’ instruments and whether this characterisation can be applied generically to all MoUs 
signed by the ECB. To answer these questions, the section begins by (A) considering what is 
deemed to be ‘soft law’ in international law and, more specifically, in the EU legal system 
(‘EU soft law’). Space precludes a detailed discussion of ‘soft law’ in these contexts, so the 
aim is to provide an overview rather than an exhaustive account. In turn, (B) we explore 
CJEU case law to identify how the practice of the ECB fits into current definitions of EU soft 
law, and point out a feature of the MoUs involving the ECB which differentiate them from 
some of the other EU soft law instruments. This feature is the element of mutuality (i.e. the 
reciprocal understanding or agreement between the two parties to be bound by the terms of 
the MoU) that goes into the end text of the Memorandum. Our analysis of legal doctrine leads 
us to conclude that simply categorising MoUs as instruments of ‘soft law’ is inadequate to 
provide a comprehensive understanding of their character and nature as well as their 
consequences. Instead, we submit that the legal doctrinal exploration of MoUs should be 
complemented by an empirical insight of the use of these instruments in practice. As such, 
the following section paves the way for the mapping out exercise that follows in Part II of 
this paper.  
 
A.  MoUs in EU law as legal acts and as instruments of ‘soft law’ 
 
A starting point in our discussion about the character and nature of MoUs in the context of 
EU law, and in particular with reference to those MoUs signed by the ECB pertains to their 
textual absence from the EU Treaties. While, therefore, EU Institutions and bodies have been 
signing MoUs with third parties for some time (e.g. MoUs have been common practice for 
the ECB), the EU Treaties provide no information about them. A glance at Article 288 TFEU, 
which conveniently defines regulations, directives, opinions and recommendations is 
revealing of the EU Treaties’ silence in relation to MoUs. This omission is almost symbolic 
of the fact that MoUs have not historically had a place in the EU legal toolbox. At the same 
time, the omission from Article 288 TFEU is not categorical as to whether MoUs are to be 
considered EU legal acts or not, or legally binding or not, for several reasons. Firstly, it is 
widely accepted in EU legal scholarship that the categorisation of legal acts in Articles 288 – 
291 TFEU is incomplete and fails to recognise other instruments developed through EU 
                                                                                                                                                  
cases C Kilpatrick, ‘The EU and its sovereign debt programmes: The challenges of liminal legality’, EUI 
Working Papers 2017/14. 
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institutional practice over time.17 Secondly, to the extent that an MoU includes an element of 
mutuality between two or more actors, it might be said to resemble international agreements 
(Article 218 TFEU) or interinstitutional agreements (Article 295 TFEU). These two types of 
agreements are also not mentioned in Article 288 TFEU but it can hardly be argued that they 
are not part of the EU legal toolbox. Thirdly, in light of the Treaty’s incomplete 
categorisation, it becomes challenging to identify whether a legal instrument used by the EU 
institutions is legally binding or has legal effects. Indeed, the Treaty provides that 
recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force. However, since it makes no 
reference to the array of other instruments utilised by EU bodies, it is naturally silent as to the 
precise legal consequences of these instruments.  
 
CJEU jurisprudence partially answers the question of whether MoUs can be considered EU 
acts. It held in Florescu that:  
 
As an act whose legal basis lies in the provisions of EU law [...] and concluded, in 
particular, by the European Union, represented by the Commission, the 
Memorandum of Understanding constitutes an act of an EU institution within the 
meaning of Article 267(b) TFEU.18 
 
The Florescu case concerned an MoU concluded between the EU (represented by the 
Commission) and a Member State (Romania) for the provision of financial assistance by the 
EU to Romania under Article 143 TFEU. The Romanian national court had asked for a ruling 
on the interpretation of the MoU which required from the CJEU a determination of whether 
the case was admissible for a preliminary reference under Article 267 TFEU. In declaring the 
admissibility of the reference request, the CJEU noted (as quoted above) that the MoU 
constituted an act of an EU institution within the meaning of Article 267(b) TFEU. This is 
because, in the case at hand, the consideration of an MoU as an EU act seems to derive from 
its roots into typical EU acts: an EU Regulation and a Council Decision which required the 
adoption of the MoU19 It is, therefore, clear from this judgment that MoUs can be considered 
acts of EU institutions. Whether for this to happen the MoU in question must always be 
underlined by a typical EU act, such as a Regulation or a Decision, has not been clarified by 
the Court. We return to this point in Part III of this paper 
 
The CJEU’s interpretation of MoUs as legal acts can be juxtaposed against the literature on 
the role of non-binding norms in the international legal system signed by international 
organisations in order to formalise and enhance cooperation with third parties.20 In this 
context, MoUs are often treated as atypical treaties or international agreements in the sense 
that they constitute an expression of political will which sets out bilateral operational 
                                                
17 P Craig and G De Burca EU Law (OUP 2015) p. 120-121; L Senden ‘Soft Post-Legislative Rulemaking: A 
Time for More Stringent Control’ (2013) 19(1) ELJ 57. 
18 Case C-258/14 Florescu v Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Sibiu, [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:448 para 35. 
19 Case C-258/14 Florescu v Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Sibiu, [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:448 paras 29 – 35. 
20 See D Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International 
Legal System (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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arrangements under a framework international agreement or regulating technical matters.21  
The term ‘soft law’ appears attractive as a means of categorising MoUs de jure and 
distinguishing them from treaties proper. Indeed, in the absence of an overarching definition, 
MoUs have conveniently been categorised by legal scholars as bilateral instruments of soft 
law adopted by two parties with a view to clarifying issues of common political interest or 
setting out a general agreement on cooperation.22Aust remarks that ‘many soft law 
instruments can be regarded as MoUs in the sense that there is no intention that they should 
be legally binding’.23 This of course begs the question of what is ‘soft law’ and whether 
describing MoUs as soft law instruments enhances our understanding of their character and 
nature.  
 
What makes soft law attractive as a concept makes it also limited as an overarching term to 
describe MoUs in general. We identify two limitations. The first is that soft law is a concept 
for which there is no universal definition and MoUs are in themselves amorphous instruments 
to be examined under soft law lenses. The second limitation is that the mainstream 
interpretation of soft law suggests a lukewarm situation where the instrument in question is 
neither strictly binding nor lacking completely legal significance. Against these limitations, 
and at the expense of legal certainty, the soft law terminology will be employed here to 
generally gauge the duality of the character of MoUS as i) binding instruments / mandatory 
acts which generate certain obligations that must be complied with; ii) non-legal norms in the 
form of mere guidance proposing a course of conduct, recommendations, policies etc.24 It is 
important to note that regardless of their effect as ‘legal’ or ‘non-legal’ (or policy 
instruments), what is common to all soft law instruments (and applies to MoUs) is that they 
are negotiated outside the legal contours and the ordinary law-making process used in a 
particular legal system for the adoption of regular acts. Additionally, soft law norms are not 
generally considered to be binding in the traditional legal sense. This is a feature which has 
generated heated discussions especially in terms of whether or not failure to abide with soft 
law constitutes a violation of a legal obligation.25    
 
Soft law scholarship identifies and examines the tension between the ‘legal’ and ‘non-legal’ 
nature of soft law. Aust submits that the term soft law is generally used to describe 
international instruments that their makers recognise are not treaties even if they employ 
mandatory language such as “shall”, but have as their purpose the promulgation of principles 
or rules (albeit not legally binding) that the authors of the text hope will become of general 
                                                
21 See M Fitzmaurice & E Olufemi, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties (Eleven International 
Publishing, 2005), p.30 
22 Senden for instance places memoranda next to notices, communications, guidelines, codes of conduct 
describing them all as soft law instruments. L Senden, The Concept of Soft Law in EC Law (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2004) p.115. Repasi also submits that ‘The choice of an MoU, being an instrument that traditionally 
does not produce legal effects, in order to lay down the conditions for financial assistance instead of an 
international legal agreement is a deliberate one made by the parties..’ R Repasi ‘Judicial protection against 
austerity measures in the euro area: Ledra and Mallis’ (2017) 54(4) 1123. 
23 A Aust, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge University Press 2010), p.11. 
24 See AG Bobek Opinion in Case C-16/16 para 82, where he states that instruments: “soft law does not easily 
fit within the binary, black and white distinction between binding and non-binding legal effects”. 
25 See below for differences in the academic debate with regard to the financial assistance MoUs, fn. ... 
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universal application.’26 Having said that, the impact of soft law instruments is far from 
trivial. Some scholars, use the term ‘soft law’ to describe legal commitments that have a 
‘soft’ or informal dimension - including in some cases a mixture between legally binding and 
non-legally binding norms.27 Senden, for instance, provides that soft law encompassess rules 
of conduct which do not enjoy legally binding force per se but may nonetheless produce such 
an effect indirectly.28  
 
Initially, therefore, it appears that it is ‘bindingness’ that distinguishes soft law from hard law 
- the latter referring to formal legal instruments that unequivocally produce binding rights and 
responsibilities. Taking, for example, MoUs entered into between the United Nations (UN) 
and third parties (such as international bodies or Member States) pursuant to the Charter of 
the UN, the term ‘Memorandum’ can be used to denote a less formal or binding international 
instrument. As remarked, however, we shall also be mindful of the relevant ‘effect’ that such 
an international instrument is capable of generating. Wessel, for instance, argues against 
‘bindingness’ being the sole determining characteristic that distinguishes between soft and 
hard law. Accordingly he comments that it is ‘confusing and does not seem to do justice to 
the fact that these norms (as law) form part of the legal order and that they commit the actors 
involved.’29 It therefore seems that soft law is capable of carrying legal and justiciable 
commitments. As Stefan further argues - although generally non-binding - soft law 
instruments can produce a large array of legal effects such as, inter alia, to create legitimate 
expectations for the individuals, to clarify the content of certain hard law provisions, and to 
structure the discretion of certain institution.30 Such legal effects could be produced by 
MoUs, depending on a number of variables such as the identity of the respective parties 
negotiating the respective MoU, the subject matter, content and wording of the MoU, as well 
as the intention of the signatories. These are factors that determine the intensity of the 
obligations to achieve a particular result and accordingly their respective legal effects and 
gravity of any potential breach that may occur after signature.31  
 
Looking more specifically now at MoUs as soft law instruments, we shall add that with 
regard to their enforceability and general legal consequences, international practice that 
applies to MoUs which produce legal effects resembles that applying to other binding 
                                                
26 A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2018), p.49. See also F Terpan, ‘Soft 
Law in the European Union—The Changing Nature of EU Law’ (2015) 21(1) European Journal of 
International Law 68. 
27 See F Terpan ‘Soft Law in the European Union—The Changing Nature of EU Law’ 
28 See for detail L Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart Publishing, 2004) 
29 RA Wessel, ‘Soft’ International Agreements in EU External Relations: Pragmatism over Principles?, Draft 
paper, presented at the ECPR SGEU Conference, Panel Hard and Soft Law in the European Union, Paris 13-15 
June 2018, p.3 
30 O Stefan, ‘European Competition Soft Law in European Courts: A Matter of Hard Principles?’ (2008) 14(6) 
European Law Journal 753. 
31 Compare for example the MoU signed between the UN and the Institut de Management et de Communication 
Interculturels on Cooperation in Training of Candidates for Language Competitive Examinations, March 2010. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/DGACM/Uploaded%20docs/ISIT.pdf with the MoU signed between the UN and the 
International Criminal Court on building the Capacity of States to Enforce in accordance with International 
Standards on the Treatment of Prisoners, Sentences of Imprisonment pronounced by the Court, September 2014. 
https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/66a7b1/pdf/  
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agreements. More specifically, it transpires that the legal effect of an agreement (binding or 
non-binding) seems to depend on the parties’ intention to be bound by it as a matter of 
international law. The intention of the signatories to be bound is established by looking at the 
terms of the agreement and the circumstances in which it was drawn up. Applying this test, 
Fitzmaurice and Olufemi conclude that ‘there is no reason to distinguish memoranda of 
understanding from any other form of agreement in this respect.’32 It follows that the name 
and form of the agreement are not decisive for establishing whether an international 
agreement is binding or not. Any form of dispute resolution mechanism (such as arbitration) 
mandated by the MoU itself or intervention by an international court such as the CJEU can 
provide a careful consideration of any ‘legal effects’ that may spring out of the MoU in 
question. A genuine attempt to resolve disputes arising inter partes or challenges by other 
natural or legal persons in this context should be without prejudice to the standard view that 
MoUs are devoid of any legal consequences. The above leads us to conclude that we shall be 
open-minded about MoUs creating grounds for legal obligations without being treaties 
themselves. By the same token, the nature and sub-components of MoUs, such as addendums 
which reflect the concurrence of wills as a result of negotiations between two parties to 
undertake a positive obligation, may also produce legal effects or consequences.33  
 
Does the above conclusion imply that ‘soft’ law instruments can become ‘hard by 
implication’?34 Scholarship remains inconclusive about the extent to which soft law 
instruments have legitimately replaced hard law in certain cases - for instance resorting to 
MoUs instead of binding bilateral agreements.35 Klabbers has been most critical about the 
drawbacks of soft law and rejects the function of soft law instruments, arguing that these 
instruments often operate as treaties in disguise.36 Looking more specifically at the EU legal 
order, Wessel appears cautious about the extent to which resort to soft law in the context of 
EU law forms a secret passage to ‘stepping outside’ the EU established legal framework (e.g. 
Article 218 TFEU) and, therefore, disregarding the EU acquis of EU external relations.37 
Likewise, we believe that recasting a soft law instrument into more familiar hard sources 
bears risks as it undermines the EU democratic process and distorts the demarcating line that 
separates an instrument that may produce legal effects from one that has both de facto and de 
jure legally binding force.38 Having said that, the CJEU has held that the duty of sincere 
cooperation (enshrined in Article 4 (3) TEU) is applicable to provisions of soft law acts and 
need to be taken into account by national authorities. As such, the obligations flowing from 
                                                
32 M Fitzmaurice & E Olufemi, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties (Eleven International Publishing, 
2005), p.30 
33 See AG Sharpston in Case C-660/13 Council of the EU v Commission [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:787. 
34 See J Klabbers, ‘The Undesirability of Soft Law’ (1998) 67(4) Nordic Journal of International Law 381. 
35 See A. Ott, ‘Soft Law in EU External Relations: Evading InternationalTreaty Law and Undermining EU 
Constitutional Principles?, Yearbook of European Law 
36 J Klabbers, ‘The undesirability of soft law’ (1998) Nordic Journal of International Law 381; J Kalbbers, ‘The 
redundancy of soft law’ (1996) Nordic Journal of International Law 167. 
37 RA Wessel, ‘Soft’ International Agreements in EU External Relations: Pragmatism over Principles?, Draft 
paper, presented at the ECPR SGEU Conference, Panel Hard and Soft Law in the European Union, Paris 13-15 
June 2018, p.4 
38 O Stefan, ‘European Competition Soft Law in European Courts: A Matter of Hard Principles?’ (2008) 14(6) 
European Law Journal 753. 
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soft law provisions shall be relied upon as a standard for reviewing the legality of EU 
secondary legislation such as Commission Decisions (hard law) but not vice versa. In both 
cases, however, the duty of sincere cooperation shall not be understood as making the 
provisions of acts of soft law binding (‘hard’). As Advocate General Wahl explained this is 
‘on pain of eluding the legislative procedure set out in the Treaty.39  
 
B. Are MoUs involving the ECB instruments of soft law? 
 
As discussed, when attempting to define MoUs under the prism of soft law, the main question 
to answer is whether MoUs are binding and/or create legal obligations. If we focus 
specifically on MoUs signed by the ECB, the ESCB Statute does not provide us with insight 
about bindingness or legal effects. The Statute is as silent on the legal character of the MoUs 
as are the EU Treaties. Instead we learn from Article 34 ESCB Statute of the type of legal 
acts that the ECB can adopt. Accordingly, the ECB can adopt regulations to implement its 
tasks in the areas of monetary policy, payment systems, prudential supervision, and in cases 
defined by the acts of the Council40; ‘ take decisions necessary for carrying out the tasks 
entrusted to the ESCB under the Treaties and the Statute’; and make recommendations and 
deliver opinions. Formally speaking, MoUs are not in the list of legal acts that the ECB can 
adopt, even though the list includes recommendations and opinions which are not legally 
binding, similarly to what MoUs allegedly are.41 The same goes for the ECB Rules of 
Procedure, which stipulate the legal acts that can be adopted by the ECB without mentioning 
Memoranda anywhere.42 Yet, as we mentioned previously in relation to Article 288 TFEU, 
the EU codified sources of law are not necessarily conclusive as to the format of an act that 
can be adopted by an EU institution or as to its binding or non-binding nature. In this sense, it 
might be useful to turn to the jurisprudence of the CJEU for further guidance on the nature of 
these MoUs.  
 
Despite the lack of presence and recognition of MoUs in the text of EU primary law as soft 
law instruments or otherwise, MoUs do not immediately appear to be immune from review 
by the Luxembourg Courts. Under Article 263 TFEU, the CJEU can review the legality of 
acts of the ECB other than recommendations and opinions, provided that these acts are 
intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. Hence, two elements need to be 
established in order to confirm the justiciability of MoUs signed by the ECB: i) that the 
Memoranda are acts of the ECB; and ii) that they produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. 
We already mentioned above that the CJEU has ruled in at least one occasion that MoUs 
constitute EU acts.43 The crucial element, therefore, for an MoU to be subjected to review by 
the CJEU, seems to be  whether it produces legal effects against third parties.  As we will see 
                                                
39 See Opinion of AG Wahl in Case C-526/14 Kotnik and Others [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:76. 
40 Article 41 ESCB Statute. 
41 Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the ECB (2016) OJ C 202/230 
(hereafter ‘ESCB Statute’) Article 34. 
42 Decision of the ECB of 19 February 2004 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the ECB (ECB/2004/2), (2004) 
OJ L 80 as amended. 
43 See above the discussion about the Florescu case. 
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below, however, the legal effects of an act do not necessarily imply that the act is also 
binding.  
 
Although the CJEU has not explicitly placed MoUs outside the spectrum of Article 263 
TFEU (provided that they produce legal effects) there is hardly any judicial guidance with 
regard to the ‘soft’ character and nature of MoUs, and in particular with regard to MoUs 
signed by the ECB. The most extensive line of relevant case law primarily concerns MoUs 
related to the grant of financial assistance to Eurozone Member States. These MoUs are not 
signed by the ECB as such, even though they involve the ECB.44 MoUs on financial 
assistance have led to some of the few cases where the fundamental question of the MoUs’ 
nature has been examined by the CJEU, giving us a glimpse into the Luxembourg judges’ 
position on the MoUs ontology. Admittedly the well-known Mallis and Ledra cases gave us 
little clarification: the CJEU found that the Article 263 TFEU challenges to the content of the 
contested MoU were inadmissible due to the fact that an MoU signed by a Member State and 
the ESM falls outside the EU legal order and thus is not a reviewable act.45 In Ledra, 
however, the CJEU found that the fact that the ESM is outside the EU legal order should not 
prevent the admissibility of a claim for damages under Article 340 TFEU (non-contractual 
liability of the EU) in the event the claimant can successfully demonstrate that there was 
unlawful conduct by the Commission and the ECB during the adoption of an MoU.  
 
The above case law has left unanswered the question of what would happen in case an MoU 
signed within the EU legal order was challenged before the CJEU under either Article 263 
TFEU or 340 TFEU. On first look, and by way of analogy with the case of Ledra, one might 
say that this route to challenging an MoU is in principle open to signatories or third parties 
whose rights might be affected. To put it differently, if this particular MoU between the ESM 
and a Member State - which merely involved the ECB - is able to be contested under Article 
340 TFEU, there is no reason why the same would not be possible for MoUs signed by the 
ECB that fall within the scope of EU law stricto sensu. As the academic debate on the legal 
nature of the financial assistance MoUs proliferates, scholars remain in stark disagreement on 
whether such MoUs resemble legally binding contracts or are to be categorised as soft law 
instruments.46 
 
More recent jurisprudence of the CJEU on ‘soft’ (non-legally binding) instruments (including 
bail-out MoUs) establishes a general pattern which can be useful vis-a-vis the legal effects 
and reviewability of Memoranda in general, and those signed by the ECB in particular.47 The 
                                                
44 Article 13 ESM Treaty, Available at: https://www.esm.europa.eu/legal-documents/esm-treaty; See also Case 
T-680/13 Chrysostomides [2018] ECLI:EU:T:2018:486 paras 201 - 204. 
45 Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P Mallis & Others v European Commission and ECB [2016] 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:702; Joined Cases C 8/15 P to C 10/15 P Ledra Advertising Ltd and Others v European 
Commission and ECB [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:70. 
46 For two contradicting views see A. Poulou ‘Financial Assistance Conditionality and Human Rights 
Protection: What is the Role of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights?’ (2017) 54(4) CMLRev 991 (and 
references therein) and R Repasi ‘Judicial protection against austerity measures in the euro area: Ledra and 
Mallis’ (2017) 54(4) CMLRev 1123. 
47 Case C-526/14 Kotnik and Others [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:767; Kotnik concerned the compatibility of bail-in 
provisions included in the 2013 Banking Communication with the general principle of proportionality. Case C-
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CJEU’s jurisprudence on non-legally binding instruments adds something distinctive and 
persuasive to our present discussion about the legal effects of MoUs, the admissibility of 
claims before the CJEU in this respect, as well as the relevant legal remedies available in case 
of dispute. In Kotnik, for instance, the CJEU considered the legal effects of a 2013 Banking 
Communication issued by the Commission as a ‘soft’ bail-in tool for restructuring banks in 
difficulty by restricting state aid in the banking sector to the minimum necessary.48 The 
Communication offered national authorities general guidance on the criteria for the 
compatibility of state aid with EU internal market rules. It also introduced specifically a so-
called ‘burden-sharing requirement’ to Member States which was designed to shift losses / 
restructure costs onto creditors and shareholders to reduce costs to taxpayers. Compliance 
with this requirement for public support to the banking sector was made subject to the 
principle of proportionality. Subsequently the constitutionality of the implementing 
provisions of Slovenian banking law was challenged by private individuals and the Slovenian 
National Council and Ombudsman. Following a preliminary reference by the Slovenian 
Constitutional Court, the CJEU confirmed the Commission’s wide discretion under Article 
107(3) TFEU when exercising its exclusive competence to approve state aid, including the 
adoption of guidelines such as the one at issue.49 
 
Despite the CJEU’s confirmation of the somewhat ‘soft’ obligations set by the Commission 
in the Communication, the judgment in Kotnik carries both a competence enhancement and 
competence restriction element for the Commission. With regard to competence 
enhancement, although the CJEU held that the Banking Communication must be interpreted 
as meaning that it is not binding on the Member States, it nonetheless affirmed the 
Commission’s strong hand in the management of Member States instituting bail-in measures 
via using soft law and more generally the competence of the EU with regard to the financial 
crisis. With reference to competence restriction, the CJEU held that although the 
Communication does no more than establish ‘soft’ guidelines, its effects limit the 
Commission in the exercise of its discretion under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU to declare 
compatible state aid that remedies a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member 
State. As such, the CJEU imposed a limit on the Commission’s discretion to approve state 
aid, because departure from the Communication’s guidelines (and arguably soft law 
instruments in general) could potentially be in breach of general principles of law, namely 
legitimate expectations, and give rise to institutional liability.  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
258/14 Florescu v Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Sibiu, [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:448. Florescu concerned the 
compatibility of austerity measures adopted by Romania (implementing the conditions that the EU had attached 
to the grant of financial assistance) with the right to property. The CJEU held that the need to rationalise public 
spending in an exceptional context of global financial crisis constitutes a legitimate limitation on the exercise of 
that fundamental right. 
48 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support 
measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (2013) OJ 216/1). 
49 See for a case analysis V Babis, ‘State Helps Those Who Help Themselves: State Aid and Burden-Sharing’ 
University of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper 62/2016. Available from 
http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/ssrn/ 
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On the other hand, Florescu (discussed perviously) concerns the flipside of MoUs. The CJEU 
provided guidance in the event an MoU has been adopted through national measures (as it 
has been the case in the context of those MoUs setting bailout conditions). Deciphering the 
extent to which these measures fall within the scope of EU law is important to a claimant (a 
privileged, natural or legal person) who can enjoy the full protection guaranteed by the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights in order to challenge a broader set of domestic measures.50 
Contrary to the MoU in the Cyprus bail-in cases, the MoU of balance-of-payments assistance 
under challenge in Florescu was an act of an EU Institution: it was concluded by the 
Commission on behalf of the European Union.51 Again contrary to the Cyprus cases, 
Florescu was not an Article 263 TFEU case but one brought before the Court via the 
preliminary reference procedure (Article 267 TFEU). As such, for admissibility purposes, and 
given that the national court had asked for a ruling on the interpretation rather than the 
validity of the MoU, it sufficed that the MoU was an EU act regardless of whether it was 
binding or whether it produced legal effects. In his Opinion, Advocate General (AG) Bot 
expressed the view that an MoU does not produce binding legal effects. Conversely, 
academic commentators argued that the CJEU’s judgment implied that the MoU in question 
had binding legal force.52 Despite these conflicting views, the CJEU left this question 
unanswered. 
 
The latest case on financial assistance MoUs, where the CJEU rejected the claims for 
compensation brought by individuals and companies in relation to the restructuring of the 
Cypriot banking sector,53 does not advance the jurisprudence on the status of the MoUs as 
soft law instruments or otherwise but offers a view on how an act of an EU institution (in this 
case a Decision of the Council) may be found to be ‘mandatory’ for the recipient.54 
According to the General Court, the wording, substance, and context of the act, as well as the 
intention of its author, need to be considered to decide on the mandatory nature of the act. In 
the case at hand, the Decision was worded in mandatory terms, using the word ‘shall’ when 
referring to the Republic of Cyprus. The Council’s written submissions to the Court showed 
that the Council intended the Decision to produce legally binding effects, while the context of 
the case indicated that it was common practice to issue such decisions attached to financial 
assistance to Member States. As a result of these factors taken together, the Decision was 
                                                
50 In Florescu the CJEU held that EU Charter of Fundamental Rights applies to national measures adopted to 
meet the conditions attached to the financial assistance granted by the EU to a Member State. Case C-258/14 
Florescu v Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Sibiu, [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:448. More recently, Case T-147/17 
Anastassopoulos and others v Council and Commission (26 September 2018 - in progress) demonstrates that 
individual claimants also rely on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in direct actions against the EU 
Institutions for damages which relate to financial losses which they allege to have incurred as a result of 
government bonds which were subject to Greek Law 4050/12 (Private Sector Investment). The claimants argue 
that they received the same treatment as legal persons (e.g. banks and funds) which resulted to discrimination 
and a breach of Article 21 of the EU Charter (non-discrimination). 
51 See discussion above, under sub-section I.A. 
52  M Markakis and P Dermine, ‘Bailouts, the Legal Status of Memoranda of Understanding, and the Scope of 
Application of the EU Charter: Florescu’ (2018) 55 (2) Common Market Law Review 643. 
53  Cases T 680/13 Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v Council and Others and T 786/14 Bourdouvali and 
Others v Council and Others [2018] ECLI:EU:T:2018:486. 
54 Council Decision of 25 April 2013 addressed to Cyprus on specific measures to restore financial stability and 
sustainable growth (2013) OJ L 141/32 ; Chrysostomides paras 183 - 193. 
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found to be ‘mandatory’ for the Member State.  Although it would be a mistake to equate a 
Decision with an MoU, not least because the former is defined in the TFEU, we can employ 
the ruling of the General Court as a draft guide for considering whether an act is ‘mandatory’ 
(a binding instrument that must be complied with) rather than mere guidance proposing a 
course of conduct.55 
 
C. Interim Conclusion  
 
For the two reasons considered above including, for instance, the absence of MoUs from the 
Treaty’s legal geography and the lack of insight into the CJEU’s approach when it considers 
a challenge against an MoU signed between the ECB and a third party, any study about the 
character and nature of MoUs signed between the ECB and a third party as soft or otherwise 
is bound to draw from the general CJEU jurisprudence in relation to ‘soft’ non-legally 
binding instruments as well as varying approaches taken by legal scholars writing in the field 
as these are sketched in the preceding sections.  
 
We shall reiterate that while soft law may be appealing as a concept in our discussion we 
shall be cautious about using it as an overarching term to describe MoUs signed by the ECB. 
As mentioned, soft law is a concept for which there is no universal definition and MoUs 
signed by the ECB vary in character to be constrained under a particular definition of soft 
law. A terminology that embraces an aggregate of the majority of approaches taken in 
relation to soft law has therefore been employed here to generally gauge the duality of the 
character of MoUS signed by the ECB. Such MoUs may manifest themselves differently: at 
times they can consist of binding instruments / mandatory acts which generate certain 
obligations that must be complied with by the signatories. In other instances they may 
constitute non-legal norms in the form of mere guidance proposing a course of conduct, 
recommendations, policies etc. 
 
Accordingly, we need to be cautious about labelling MoU obligations as ‘soft’ using a 
blanket description that has been customarily employed to describe heterogeneous non-treaty 
instruments such as codes of practice, declarations, guidelines or recommendations. In 
particular, our position is that ‘non-legal’ soft law is not a term that paints the full picture 
when it comes to MoUs signed by the ECB. Although it may be an exaggeration to call some 
MoUs signed by the ECB disguised legal agreements or disguised contracts, we may run the 
risk of simplification by taxonomizing them as mere instruments that streamline policy 
programmes. Such simplification could affect the legal clarity of the commitments 
undertaken by the relevant parties as well as difficulties regarding the enforcement of 
individual rights. For instance, although soft law provisions appear to bind the EU 
Institutions, the Commission retains certain discretion and flexibility in most of the areas 
where it has issued guidelines or notices, and can depart from soft law if it justifies its action 
in a satisfactory way. It is not clear whether this is an option for the ECB, for instance, vis-a-
vis certain MoUs that will be discussed later in this contribution and which go beyond having 
                                                
55 After all, Decisions are legally binding by virtue of Article 288 TFEU.  
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merely legal relevance. These concern, for instance, MoUs signed after the establishment of 
the Banking Union where there is a visible link between the MoU in question and an EU 
legal act such as a Regulation. A violation of the tems of the MoU in this respect may raise 
questions about breaching the respective obligations under the Regulation. 
 
There are also institutional challenges produced by using ‘non-legal’ soft law terminology to 
describe MoUs signed by the ECB, namely that soft law does not offer solutions to the 
problem of distribution of powers among the EU Institutions who choose to sign MoUs that 
may inhibit the unity of EU law. For instance soft law guidelines can hardly help us ascertain 
whether it is the ECB that represents the EU as a whole or merely itself - acting in an 
independent capacity - when it chooses to negotiate and adopt an MoU with a third party. 
Moreover, there is a certain lack of clarity as to the depth of obligations produced by soft law, 
which is reflected also in our understanding of Memoranda. As Terpan puts it, ‘when rules 
are enshrined in a source other than a formal treaty or a binding unilateral act, or when they 
have not been legalised by a jurisdiction, there is a presumption that these rules do not create 
clear legal obligations.’56 Yet at the same time, rules found in such sources are often stronger 
than a ‘best effort obligation.’57 Seen along these lines, MoUs are somewhere in the middle 
between formal acts, and mere agreements between two parties that stipulate a best efforts 
obligation towards achieving a common objective.  
 
Last, the ‘soft law’ terminology does not help meet challenges of procedural nature which the 
ECB may have overlooked at the time of signing an MoU in the context of the EMU, such as 
the potential justiciability of MoUs or, more generally speaking, the role of the EU courts in 
adjudicating issues pertaining to MoUs. For instance, the CJEU’s recent jurisprudence 
discussed here about the reviewability of non-legally binding MoUs58 puts into sharp relief 
the orthodox approach that (soft law) acts which are not legally binding do not produce legal 
effects and fall outside the jurisdiction of the Luxembourg Court under Article 263 TFEU 
stricto sensu. This does not necessarily indicate a radical change to the way the CJEU has 
been setting its admissibility criteria. It might simply be the result of the fact that cases 
involving MoUs have only recently appeared before the CJEU. Hence, the CJEU only 
recently had the opportunity to consider the reviewability of these instruments and provide us 
with hints about their nature, which were not available to the ECB and the other signatories 
so far. With the establishment of the Banking Union it is almost inevitable that further cases 
will arise in the future with regard to the ECB’s competences and decision-making powers, 
and possibly also with regard to MoUs. Yet, for the time being, taking the above into 
consideration it emerges that labelling the MoUs signed by the ECB as ‘soft law’ species 
does not demystify or denounce the fundamental challenges discussed above. 
 
 
                                                
56 F Terpan, ‘Soft Law in the European Union—The Changing Nature of EU Law’ (2015) 21(1) European 
Journal of International Law 68 p.73. 
57 F Terpan, ‘Soft Law in the European Union—The Changing Nature of EU Law’ (2015) 21(1) European 
Journal of International Law 68 p.73. 
58 C-660/13 Council of the EU v Commission [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:787. 
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II. Mapping out the MOUs signed by the ECB 
 
The discussion so far has provided some tentative conclusions and illustrated some remaining 
gaps as to what is the legal status of MoUs used in areas of EU law or signed by the ECB. 
Given the lack of answers to some basic questions underlying the legal status of MoUs, the 
purpose of the remaining analysis is to create an analytical framework that can help us in 
practice to understand the nature, operation, and legal consequences of MoUs signed by the 
ECB. To do so, we first need to map the publicly available MoUs signed by the ECB to this 
day, which has not been done anywhere in the literature so far. This exercise will serve a 
twofold aim: firstly, it will provide the right context for this article to draw conclusions on the 
legal consequences flowing from MoUs. Secondly, it will allow us to identify and critique the 
main themes that arise from the use of MoUs, which will be used later to structure a legal 
framework for the use of these instruments by the ECB. 
 
A general description of MoUs involving the ECB is an inevitable part of this discussion. 
Broadly speaking, MoUs involving the ECB fall into two categories. The first category 
includes MoUs that aim to facilitate exchange of information, policy dialogue, and 
cooperation, between the ECB and EU bodies; Member State authorities; and non-EU actors 
and bodies such as third country central banks. Examples of MoUS falling under this 
category include the 2013 ‘MoU on the cooperation between the members of the European 
Statistical System and the Members of the ESCB’, and the 2009 ‘MoU between the 
Eurosystem and 27 central securities depositories on T2S’. As will be subsequently seen, 
further distinctions can be made in this category depending on the policy areas affected by 
different MoUs (e.g. pre- and post-Banking Union MoUs).  
 
The second category of MoUs relates to granting financial assistance to Eurozone Member 
States. We shall clarify that these MoUs are not signed by the ECB as such but - as 
mentioned previously - involve the ECB in other ways. Acknowledging the exceptional 
nature of these MoUs, which were signed in times of steep financial problems facing the 
Eurozone, we consider them as part of the broader discussion rather than the main guiding 
model in our subsequent analysis. In other words, given that the ECB is not a signatory of 
those MoUs per se, we are more interested in the general principles that emanate from the 
case-law surrounding these Memoranda, as previously discussed, rather than their drafting or 
their content as such.  
 
Before we continue our analysis, we should reiterate a point made previously. For this 
contribution, we compiled and analysed a dataset of MoUs that are available for the public 
and can be accessed online. We collected and analysed those MoUs whose full text is 
available. Where the full text was not available online, we used the official ECB Press 
Releases announcing the conclusion of an MoU between the ECB and another actor, which 
inevitably gave us more limited information than the fully available MoUs. When delving 
into the ECB Annual Supervisory Reports, it became apparent that the ECB is involved in 
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banking supervision MoUs which are neither available online, nor announced to the public 
via a Press Release. For example, the 2017 ECB Annual Report on Supervisory Activities 
states that in 2017 the ECB was part of 30 MoU negotiations from which it concluded 15 
MoUs.59 It also states that since the establishment of the SSM, the ECB has concluded MoUs 
with 25 supervisory authorities and joined existing MoUs that were previously signed 
between (i) euro area’s National Competent Authorities (NCAs) and 9 supervisory authorities 
of the non-euro area EU Member States, and (ii) euro area’s NCAs and 49 third country 
authorities. Annex I to this paper sets out the MoUs that constitute our dataset. As is 
apparent, our dataset is more limited than the information provided in the 2017 ECB Annual 
Report. What follows is a discussion of our main observations with regard to the MoUs that 
are stipulated in the dataset of Annex I to this paper. 
 
A. Diverse policy areas, signatories, and objectives 
 
One of the first things that one notices when looking at the list of the MoUs involving the 
ECB is the diversity of the policy areas and subject matters of the various Memoranda.60  As 
we mentioned above, the MoUs under study concern various subjects. A dominant subject 
area is that of statistical information. An MoU signed in 2003 delineates the areas of 
responsibility in economic and financial statistics between the ECB DG Statistics and 
Eurostat, a 2013 MoU provides for the cooperation between the members of the European 
Statistical System and the members of the ESCB for the exchange of statistical information, 
and a 2016 MoU sets out practical working arrangements for the cooperation between 
Eurostat and ECB DG Statistics on the quality of statistics underlying the Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Process. In all three MoUs, the signatories are internal, EU, actors and their 
national counterparts: either the ECB and Eurostat or the European Statistical System - which 
includes national statistical institutes - and the ESCB - which includes national central banks.  
 
Another set of MoUs concerns operations for the Eurosystem. An MoU dating back in 2001, 
replaces a previous arrangement that was in force since 1994 and deals with the effects of the 
EMU on the interplay between function of payment systems oversight and that of prudential 
supervision. It attempts to address, by way of co-operation and information sharing in Stage 
Three of the EMU, the gap between the EU-level oversight of payment systems, and the 
nationally-controlled function of prudential supervision with regard to large value payment 
systems. The parties to the MoU were the overseers of the payment systems (i.e. the National 
Central Banks of all the Member States) and the banking supervisors of all the Member 
States.  
 
                                                
59 2017 ECB Annual Report on Supervisory Activity, p.63, available at: 
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/publications/annual-report/html/index.en.html> 
60 It should be noted that our findings are based on the dataset of MoUs included in Annex I to this article. 
While some of these Memoranda were fully available online to the public, others were not and therefore with 
regard to those MoUs we had to confine our research to the relevant Press Releases. This includes mainly MoUs 
signed between the ECB and third-country banks such as the Central Bank of Russia. Annex I stipulates which 
Memoranda were not publicly available. Annex II sets out the publicly available MoUs that contain 
confidentiality clauses, for the purposed of the analysis further on. 
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Interestingly, the ECB is not a signatory to all the MoUs concerning the Eurosystem. For 
instance, the 2010 MoU regarding exchange of information among national central credit 
registers is published by the ECB but does not mention the ECB as a party to the 
Memorandum. The text of the Memorandum defines the parties as the national central banks 
of Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Romania and 
Spain.61  By way of contrast, a 2015 MoU on adapting banknote equipment to the then new 
€20 banknote identifies the ECB, the National Central Banks (NCBs) of the Eurosystem, and 
industry partners (e.g. European industry associations, banknote equipment manufacturers 
and other partners) as the parties that undertake to work towards a common goal under the 
Memorandum. The ECB is a signatory of two additional MoUs that could also fall in this 
(sub-)category and that are connected with Securities operations: a 2009 MoU between the 
Eurosystem and central securities depositories (i.e. Eurozone NCBs) on the Target2 
Securities project, and a more recent (2016) MoU between ESMA, National Securities 
Regulators and ECB for the exchange of information. 
 
From 2012 afterwards, we see public announcements of MoUs on  technical and policy 
cooperation between the ECB and third-country central banks or other third-country bodies. 
The only recorded MoU with a third country central bank prior to 2012 is an MoU between 
the ECB and the People’s Bank of China, which was signed in 2002 and renewed in 2008.62 
One of the notable characteristics of these Memoranda is that they are not publicly available; 
there is only a Press Release announcing each of the post-2012 ones, and information about 
the ECB-People’s Bank of China can only be found in the ECB Annual Reports. This makes 
it uncertain whether this type of MoUs were not signed by the ECB before 2012 or whether 
there is simply no public information about them. Two such MoUs were signed in 2012, one 
with the Central Bank of Turkey and one with the Bank of Russia. In addition, the ECB 
signed an MoU with the Reserve Bank of India in 2015, one on cooperation with Banco 
Central do Brasil in 2016, and one with the South African Reserve Bank in 2018. The Press 
Releases for the three latter Memoranda are identical.63 In 2017, the ECB signed an MoU 
with the US Office of Financial Research. 
The final policy area that we see MoUs being signed by the ECB is that of banking 
supervision. This is one of the most interesting set of MoUs given that banking supervision is 
one of the areas that has changed the most in recent years and especially after 2013 when the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation was adopted. These changes lead to a 
number of questions regarding the MoUs in this policy field, including whether some of the 
                                                
61 Page 3 of the MoU. 
62 There is no Press Release for this MoU but it is mentioned in the 2002 and 2008 ECB Annual Reports.  
63 Further information about these MoUs is given in the 2012 ECB Annual Report (p.144-145), according to 
which the ECB-Bank of Turkey MoU focuses on technical and policy cooperation in the areas of ‘financial 
stability, research and monetary policy, communication and international relations, markets and statistics’. The 
ECB-Bank of Russia MoU lays the groundwork for continued cooperation between the two banks ‘at the 
technical and policy levels, an information exchange on economic and financial developments, and a joint 
programme of cooperation activities. The parties agreed to focus on monetary policy, financial stability and 
banking supervision in the initial cooperation phase. The ECB will implement the programme of cooperation 
activities together with euro area NCBs.’ Finally, the 2015 ECB Annual Report states that the 2015 MoU with 
the Reserve Bank of India was signed in the context of the cooperation between the ECB and central banks of 
G20 emerging market economies ‘with a view to sharing technical expertise and best practices.   
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older Memoranda have become redundant by virtue of new secondary legislation such as the 
SSM Regulation64, and whether the new secondary legislation itself makes obligatory the 
signature of relevant MoUs. These substantive questions are discussed later on. For now, 
suffice it to outline the MoUs that fall within this category, noting the instances where 
previous Memoranda have been replaced with more recent ones. 
 
The ECB is also signatory to a 2003 MoU, together with national banking supervision 
authorities and EU national central banks (then 14 countries), which sets out ‘high-level 
principles of co-operation’ between these parties in crisis management situations. Since this 
Memorandum was signed at a time of an upcoming expansion for the EU with the future 
accession of ten new Member States to the Union, the text of the MoU provided that ‘the 
banking supervisory authorities and central banks of acceding countries will be invited to 
become parties to the MoU once these countries have joined the EU’. As such, a 
complementary MoU was signed in 2005, this time including as signatories the newly-
acceded EU Member States, and the EU Finance Ministries, which were not included in the 
2003 MoU.65 Neither the 2003 nor the 2005 MoUs are publicly available. However, a 
publicly available MoU signed in 2008 extends, updates, and replaces the 2005 MoU. It also 
seems to shift the attention from crisis management situations to ‘Cross-Border Financial 
Stability’, while its signatories are Financial Supervisory Authorities, Finance Ministries and 
other Ministries according to national competencies, Central Banks in Member States, and 
the ECB.  
  
Post-2013, the attention shifts to MoUs relating to the new EU supervisory structure. Two 
types of MoUs can be identified here. The first is Memoranda signed between the ECB and 
EU institutions or bodies. This includes an MoU signed by the ECB and the Council of the 
European Union in 2013, which provides for the cooperation on procedures related to the 
SSM, and an  MoU between the ECB and the Single Resolution Board (SRB) which covers 
cooperation and information exchange and was signed in 2015 and revised in 2018. The 
second type of MoUs includes Memoranda signed between the ECB and national authorities / 
bodies of EU Member States. In this category we can include two MoUs signed in December 
2016. The first MoU is signed between the ECB and the financial supervisory authorities of 
the four Member States and deals with prudential supervision of significant branches in 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland.66 In 2017, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, and Lithuania, 
acceded to this MoU. The second is an MoU between the Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish 
Ministries of Finance and the Danish Ministry of Business on cooperation regarding 
                                                
64 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central 
Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (2013) OJ L 287/63 
(Hereafter ‘SSM Regulation’). 
65 MoU on co-operation between the Banking Supervisors, Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the 
European Union in Financial Crisis situations, 2005. A 2007 MoU provides for the adherence of the central 
banks of the new Member States, Bulgaria and Romania, both to the 2003 MoU on high-level principles of co-
operation in crisis management situations, and the 2001 MoU on cooperation between payment systems 
overseers and banking supervisors. 
66 MoU Between Finansinspektionen (Sweden), Finanstilsynet (Norway), Finanstilsynet (Denmark), 
Finanssivalvonta (Finland) and the European Central Bank on prudential supervision of significant branches in 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland, 2016. 
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significant branches of cross-border banking groups. Although the ECB is not a signatory of 
this MoU, it is affected by the provisions of the MoU, which refers to the ECB as one of the 
competent authorities of host Member States (under the SSM Regulation) and recognises the 
need for close and timely information sharing between competent and resolution authorities 
of home and host Member States.67   
 
Beyond the differences in their subject matters, the above-mentioned MoUs also have a 
number of diverse goals, although two predominant objectives characterise the majority of 
the MoUs: i) cooperation and ii) exchange of information between the signatories. Other 
objectives include the amendment of an internal ECB document (e.g. the ECB Governing 
Body’s Code of Conduct), the expression of a mutual commitment of the signatories to work 
towards a certain project (e.g. Target2 Securities, and the introduction of the new 20 Euro 
banknote), and the distinction of areas of responsibilities between bodies with overlapping 
tasks (e.g. the 2003 MoU between the ECB and Eurostat). One MoU concerns internal ECB 
affairs, setting out a Code of Conduct (i.e. ethical conventions, standards and benchmarks) 
for the members of the ECB Governing Council and their alternatives.68 A later amendment 
to this Code via a new MoU introduces more detailed provisions on the independence of the 
Governing Council. 
 
The two objectives of cooperation and exchange of information are often presented together 
in MoUs. The only MoU that refers to exchange of information as a sole objective is the 2010 
Memorandum on the exchange of information among national central credit registers, which 
establishes a framework for the regular and ad hoc exchange of information among central 
credit registers and commits the parties to exchange information in accordance with this 
framework.69 Cooperation here is mentioned only as something that needs to take place 
between of the authorities in case of difficulties with the received data. 
 
In other instances, exchange of information can be seen as one of the means of cooperation 
between the parties. An indicative example is the 2003 ‘MoU on high-level principles of 
cooperation between banking supervisors and central banks in crisis management situations’ 
which ‘consists of a set of principles and procedures for cross border cooperation between 
banking supervisors and central banks in crisis situations.’ The flow of information between 
involved authorities is only one of the issues dealt with in the MoU, others being the 
identification of the relevant authorities, and the creation of a logistical infrastructure to 
support the enhanced cooperation between authorities. The fact that cooperation takes a 
broader format than exchange of information is also evidenced by the statement that 
‘cooperation will take the form required by the specific features of the crisis and with regard 
to all the relevant supervisory and central banking tasks and functions.’70 The same can be 
                                                
67 See 2016 MoU paras 9-10, 16-17, and 27. 
68 The MoU was signed in 2002 by the members of the Governing Council and amended in 2006. 
69 It should be noted that this MoU was discontinued in September 2018, after the mutual agreement of the 
participants that its objectives are now achieved through harmonisation 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/govcdec/otherdec/2018/html/ecb.gc180928.en.html> 
70 From the relevant Press Release. 
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said about the 2015 MoU between the ECB and the SRB, whereby the exchange of 
information is considered to be one of the ways for cooperation between the two signatories, 
with other examples being the alignment of the annual work cycle of the ECB and the SRB 
on recovery and resolution planning, and on-site inspections.71 
 
One of the MoUs whose objectives stands out is the 2013 MoU between the Council and the 
ECB on the cooperation on procedures related to the SSM. Although the title of the 
Memorandum refers to ‘cooperation’, the actual text focuses on the accountability and 
reporting obligations of the ECB, as a banking supervisor, to the Council and the Eurogroup. 
Unlike other MoUs, this Memorandum between the ECB and the Council appears more as a 
document setting out the accountability-related obligations of the ECB and less as our 
traditional understanding of a Memorandum as a document which underpins the intention of 
the signatories to work towards a common objective. The two main sections of the 
Memorandum are entitled “Accountability” and “Selection and Appointment Procedures”. 
Hence, neither refer to exchange of information or cooperation in the same way as other 
MoUs focus on these two objectives. Although the final provisions of the 2013 MoU mention 
the confidentiality requirements that must be applied to the ‘information exchanged’ under 
the Memoranda, the text itself only refers to information that must be sent by the ECB to the 
Council and the Eurogroup in the form of Annual Reports. It also mentions the exchange of 
views that takes place during the bi-annual exchange of views between the Chair of 
Supervisory Board and the Eurogroup. In other words, it seems as if the ECB has the 
predominant role of sender of information, while the Council and Eurogroup are presented as 
the recipient of it.  
 
The different nature of this MoU probably results from underlying secondary legislation 
which dictates the relationship between, on the one hand, the ECB and, on the other hand, the 
Council and Eurogroup. Article 20 SSM Regulation sets out the accountability and reporting 
obligations of the former to the latter institutions, which are mirrored in the text of the 2013 
MoU. It appears that the purpose of the MoU is to put flesh on the bones of SSM Regulation 
by specifying inter alia the procedure in which the ECB should fulfil its legal obligations to 
disclose information to the Council and the Eurogroup.72 It can therefore be said that the 
origins of this MoU in secondary law explain why there is no reciprocity in disclosing 
information, in contrast to other MoUs with cooperation objectives. Moreover, this MoU can 
be conceptualised as a joint attempt by two institutions to improve accountability in the area 
of the SSM along the lines of EU secondary legislation.  
 
B. Common drafting features and characteristics 
 
There are four notable common features in the drafting of the MoUs signed by the ECB. 
These features have to do with the way the Memoranda: i) attempt to stipulate and limit their 
                                                
71 Paragraph 1 of the MoU. See also the 2008 MoU on Crisis Management, which states that cooperation will 
involve the exchange of information but also, inter alia, the creation of a framework for cooperation on 
preparing common solutions and actions to manage a potential crisis.  
72 The opening text of the 2013 MoU explicitly refers to Articles 20(1) to (4) and (6) of the SSM Regulation. 
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legal nature; ii) describe how they fit within the general, applicable, (EU) legal framework; 
iii) determine how the parties should resolve potential disagreements; and iv) set out 
confidentiality and professional secrecy obligations for the parties. What follows is a 
description of each of these features based on a survey of all the publicly available relevant 
MoUs, coupled by a reflection of issues that may arise in regard of each. Our purpose is not 
to find specific differences between each Memorandums through a comparison of the clauses 
in the MoUs. We acknowledge that MoUs are negotiated between two or more parties and 
that these negotiations entail compromises between the parties. Hence, we also take into 
consideration in our analysis that deviations to the clauses of the MoUs may simply be due to 
the fact that not all parties agreed on the insertion of a particular clause in the final text of a 
memorandum.  
 
Taking into consideration the space for compromises among parties during the negotiation 
process of MoUs, the following analysis does not intent to consider the four features 
identified above as free-standing elements of the memorandums. Instead, it is argued that for 
the main purpose of this article, which is to decipher the legal nature of the MoUs, the four 
features  are not mutually exclusive, but they are complementary to each other. To use an 
example, we can only appreciate the full extent of an MoU clause which provides that 
disputes should only be resolved internally (relevant to feature iii) if we go back and assess 
the parties’ intentions objectively. In this hypothetical scenario it may be the case that the 
parties did not intend the MoU to have a legally binding nature in the first place (relevant to 
feature i). The parties’ intention to create legal relations will more often than not be 
manifested textually in the MoU. In turn, the wording of an MoU vis-a-vis its legal nature can 
affect the role of the CJEU in potential litigation and dispute resolution. In the event the 
wording of the relevant MoU excludes the CJEU’s adjudicatory role, we need to have a 
separate discussion about whether another dispute mechanism is required (back to feature iii). 
Along the same lines, one can find it hard to understand how a confidentiality clause is to be 
enforceable or even workable (feature iv) if the MoU prompts us to make the assumption that 
the parties involved did not recognise the MoU’s legal nature and binding obligations that 
may flow from it (feature i). Before we engage with these issues, let us go back in our 
assessment of the four features identified above which are common in the drafting of the 
MoUs signed by the ECB.  
 
i. Dealing with the MoU’s legal nature: Disclaimer clauses  
The first notable, common textual feature of almost all the publicly available MoUs is the 
way in which they deal with their own legal nature, which most of the times is connected to 
how they describe the intentions of the parties signing / involved in the Memorandum. In the 
majority of instances where these ‘disclaimer clauses’ appear, it is to signal the ‘non-legally 
binding nature’ of the document, or the intention of the parties not to create any legally 
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enforceable rights by signing the MoU. Such provisions sometimes appear even in the Press 
Releases announcing the conclusion of MoUs whose full text is not publicly available.73  
 
Most of the MoUs make a clear effort to explain the parties’ position on the issue by using 
phrases such as: ‘the provisions of this MoU are not legally binding on the parties and 
therefore no legal claim by any party or third party may arise in the course of its practical 
implementation.’74 One of the clearest statements is included in the 2015 MoU between the 
SRB and the ECB, which devotes an entire paragraph on the legal nature of the MoU. 
Paragraph 4 of the Memorandum states that ‘this MoU is a statement of intent and does not 
create any directly or indirectly enforceable rights. The Participants shall fulfil their 
responsibilities under this MoU on a best-effort basis.’75 A similarly elaborate clause is 
included in the 2017 MoU between the Office of Financial Research and the ECB, which 
states: ‘This MoU does not create any legally binding obligations, confer any rights, or 
supersede any US or EU laws or regulatory requirements in force on the parties’ respective 
jurisdictions. Accordingly, the MoU also does not confer upon any person the right or ability 
to directly or indirectly obtain, suppress, or exclude any information or to challenge the 
execution of a request for assistance under this MoU’ (paragraph 2.6). 
 
In other Memoranda, disclaimer clauses are more brief and take it as a given that the MoU in 
question is not legally binding, by stating: ‘[a]s the provisions of this Memorandum are not 
legally binding on the Participants, they may not give rise to any legal claim on behalf of any 
Participant or third parties in the course of their practical implementation.’76 Only few MoUs 
are silent on their legal nature77, which gives rise to the question of whether they should be 
perceived differently than the rest: does their silence amount to an intention to create (or 
maintain) some sort of legally binding effects or to impose stronger obligations on the 
signatory parties to follow the line of the Memorandum? Or is it the case that the parties 
assume that an MoU is by default non-binding and therefore see no need to specify this in the 
text of the Memorandum? A final question which is particularly important for the purpose of 
our analysis concerns the extent to which Memoranda which lack disclaimer clauses are 
generally capable of protecting their signatories from liability. 
 
ii. Fitting the MoU in the general legal framework: Context clauses 
The second common feature in various MoUs is that they include paragraphs / clauses 
contextualising the Memoranda vis-a-vis the general EU - and, often, national - legal 
                                                
73 Press Release for the 2005 MoU on cooperation between the banking supervisors, central banks, and finance 
ministries of the European Union in Financial Crisis situation which defines the MoU as a ‘non-legally binding 
instrument for setting forth practical arrangements’. 
74 2010 MoU on the exchange of information among national central credit registers for the purpose of passing it 
on to reporting institutions. 
75 The phrase ‘statement of intent’ also appears in the 2017 MoU between the Office of Financial Research and 
the ECB (Paragraph 2). 
76 2008 MoU on cross-border financial stability; 2016 MoUs (2 MoUs) between Sweden, Norway, Denmark, 
Finland, and the ECB. 
77 2003 MoU on economic and financial statistics between DG Statistics and Eurostat; 2013 MoU between the 
Council and the ECB on the SSM; 2016 MoU between Eurostat and the ECB on the quality assurance of 
statistics underlying the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. 
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framework. Similarly to the ‘disclaimer clauses’, the ‘context clauses’ exist to limit the 
effects of the MoU vis-a-vis the existing legal framework: their main objective is to prevent 
the respective MoUs from being interpreted as affecting the competence delimitation between 
the signatories, or as binding the current and future applicable legal framework. For instance, 
the 2003 MoU between the ECB and Eurostat states that it has been signed ‘without prejudice 
to the EU competences of the Commission and the ESCB and ECB’ and thus does not 
prevent the further development of the relevant legal framework on the collection of 
statistical information.78  
 
Other context clauses state the relation between the MoU and national legislation. For 
instance, the 2010 MoU on the exchange of information among national central credit 
registers declares that it does not commit parties to the exchange of information where this is 
not allowed by national legislation.79 A more recent MoU, namely the 2015 SRB-ECB MoU, 
states that it does not modify or supersede any EU or national laws or any other provisions 
under other agreements applicable to the parties (paragraph 4.2).80 Reading paragraph 4.2 of 
the same Memorandum as a whole, we can even observe a reference to the status of this MoU 
in a kind of ‘hierarchy’ of instruments: The MoU is below EU law, national laws, and other 
provisions that apply to the ECB and the SRB under multilateral or bilateral agreements.  
 
In other instances, a context clause defines the link between two Memoranda which concern 
the same issue but were signed at different times. Such clauses may state that the 
Memorandum extends, updates, or complements a previous MoU, or declare the renewed 
commitment of the Parties to the Memorandum.81 Others define which Memorandum shall 
prevail in case of a conflict between an older and a more recent MoU.82  
 
Finally, context clauses are sometimes used to link a Memorandum with specific secondary 
legislation or other EU acts. These clauses resemble provisions found in the Preambles of EU 
acts, which set out the legal basis for the said act. In particular, some MoUs are very closely 
linked with secondary EU legislation or are signed because secondary EU legislation 
necessitates or allows for their conclusion. MoUs signed after the establishment of the 
Banking Union are prime examples of a close link between an MoU and an EU legal act. 
Specifically, the 2015 MoU between the SRB and the ECB was concluded on the basis of 
Articles 30(7), and 34(5) of the SRM Regulation.83 The former requires the signature of an 
                                                
78 The 2008 ‘MoU on cooperation between the financial supervisory authorities, central banks and finance 
ministries of the European Union on cross-border financial stability’ states that ‘cooperation between the parties 
will take place on the basis of the existing institutional and legal framework for financial stability in Member 
States as well as the applicable Community legislation, fully respecting the roles and division of responsibilities 
among the Parties.’ 
79 See also the 2016 MoU between Eurostat and ECB, clause H, which states that the MoU ‘is without prejudice 
to reporting and quality assessment obligations following from Union legislation.’ 
80 See also the 2016 MoU between Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and the ECB on prudential supervision, 
para. 14, and the MoU between the ECB and the Office of Financial Research para 2.7. 
81 See, e.g. 2008 MoU on cooperation between the financial supervisory authorities, central banks and finance 
ministries of the European Union on cross-border financial stability. 
82 2016 MoU between Eurostat and ECB, clause H. 
83 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing 
uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the 
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MoU regarding cooperation, and the latter of an MoU regarding exchange of information. 
The resulting Memorandum covers both. This is the only example from our dataset whereby 
secondary legislation specifically refers to the conclusion of an MoU to achieve a specific 
purpose.  
 
By way of comparison, legislation referenced in other Memoranda merely requires close 
cooperation84 or another connection between the parties. In these instances, the Memoranda 
seem to be an instrument of choice rather than one stipulated in secondary EU law. Take here 
as an example the 2013 Council - ECB MoU on the SSM, which refers to the EU legislation 
(i.e. the SSM Regulation) that mandates the accountability and reporting obligations of the 
ECB, which are covered in the Memorandum itself. Differently from the background to the 
2015 MoU, the SSM Regulation does not mention either a need or possibility for the 
conclusion of an MoU between the Council and the ECB. It merely states that the ECB has 
legal obligations to the Council and the Eurogroup, which are further detailed in the MoU.85 
As a matter of fact, arrangements made between the European Parliament and the ECB for 
the accountability and reporting of the latter institution (i.e. the same subject-matter as the 
2015 MoU) were made through an Interinstitutional Agreement between the Parliament and 
the ECB.86 It seems, therefore, that the conclusion of an MoU between the Council and the 
ECB was a choice by the parties among other alternatives.  
 
iii. Settling potential disagreements: Settlement clauses 
Linked with the two issues above (i.e. the legal nature of the MoUs and their position in the 
general legal framework) is the third common feature of some Memoranda, namely the 
inclusion of a few sentences or paragraphs stipulating what will happen in case of 
disagreement concerning the MoU - i.e. who is the responsible person or body to resolve the 
disagreement, and through which process. For the purpose of this article, we can name these 
‘settlement clauses’. One can assume here that these types of clauses are necessary given that 
the parties perceive the MoUs as non-legally binding. To put it simply, if the assumption is 
that the EU courts cannot review or intervene in a non-legally binding act / document, there 
needs to be some other way to resolve disagreements which may arise in the course of these 
acts, such as differences in the interpretation of the MoU.  
 
This alternative way of settling disagreements is usually internal and rather informal, and 
takes place first at a working level. Only if no solution is found, the disagreement is taken to 
the signatories. The 2016 Eurostat-ECB MoU, for instance, specifies that disagreements 
between the parties to the MoU should be resolved ‘at a working level with a view to 
                                                                                                                                                  
framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010 (2014) OJ L 141/1 (hereafter ‘SRM Regulation’). 
84 2016 MoU between the Eurostat and the ECB on the quality assurance of statistics underlying the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. 
85 See discussion above, S.2A, page … 
86 Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank on the 
practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and oversight over the exercise of the tasks 
conferred on the ECB within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (2013/694/eu) (2013) OJ L 
320/1. 
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reaching an amicable solution.’87 If the matter is not resolved within two months, it should be 
referred to the signatories. The 2015 SRB-ECB MoU contains a similar clause88 - only, this 
time, stipulating the confidential nature of the procedure. According to the clause, the first 
port of call is direct negotiations between relevant units and representatives appointed by the 
SRB and the ECB. Only if this negotiation stage is not effective the dispute will proceed to 
the senior management or the permanent Board Members of the SRB and members of the 
Executive Board of the ECB who can provide for a final resolution to the issue.  
 
Admittedly, only the minority of the MoUs contain such settlement clauses. Yet, the 
existence of these clauses is, in itself, of interest to our research. If not anything else, these 
clauses raise the question of the connection between an MoU and traditional litigation via the 
European Courts. Moreover, we can ask what difference these clauses make: what is the 
authority that will resolve a dispute arising under the MoUs which do not contain a settlement 
clause? In this sense, it is also relevant to note the one MoU that stands out with regard to its 
settlement / remedies provisions. The 2009 Target2-Securities MoU includes a clause 
(paragraph 5.5) that limits the available remedies for a party to the rights to withdraw and be 
excluded from the Memorandum. By virtue of this clause, parties do not have access to any 
other remedy, including those for breach of contract. This clause covers the entire MoU 
except the part on confidential information for which parties are entitled to ‘any additional 
rights or remedies’ that they may have under ‘the applicable statutory law’, which is the law 
applicable at the seat of the ECB (paragraph 7.4). It is also the only MoU which states that 
disagreements between the parties can be submitted to settlement under the Rules of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (paragraph 7.6). 
 
iv. Requesting confidentiality: Confidentiality and professional secrecy clauses 
Finally, the last common feature among the MoUs is the attention they place on 
confidentiality.  A number of Memoranda are not even publicly available.89 Moreover, all but 
one of the publicly available MoUs signed by, or involving, the ECB include ‘confidentiality 
clauses’, which impose requirements of confidentiality and professional secrecy on their 
signatories.90 These clauses are phrased in a similar, but not identical, manner, and they 
typically take the format of one or two clauses in the text (e.g. paragraphs, or references in 
the Preamble to the MoU). Only some MoUs define in detail what information is considered 
to be confidential and what not.91 Overall, there is no consistency in these confidentiality 
clauses and the law they refer to. Memoranda can be found which refer to ‘Community and 
national legislation’; ‘the applicable Community and national confidentiality and professional 
secrecy regulations’; ‘applicable confidentiality rules’; and ‘relevant Union law’. 
 
                                                
87 2016 MoU between Eurostat and ECB, para.I. For a similarly worded clause see the 2003 MoU between the 
ECB and the Eurostat, para.23. 
88 Paragraph 15 of the MoU. 
89 See Annex I. 
90 The only MoU that does not include a confidentiality clause is the 2006 MoU amending the ECB Governing 
Council Code of Conduct. 
91 See the 2009 Target2 MoU, and - albeit in a different format - see the Annex to the 2017 MoU between the 
Office of Financial Research and the ECB. 
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Despite the difference in the wording of these provisions, one key observation can be made: 
the confidentiality and professional secrecy obligations have their origin in other sources, 
which are not the Memorandum as such. In fact, layers of obligations appear to be applicable 
to the MoUs. These layers consist of obligations deriving from EU law and national law and 
more than one layers may apply to a Memorandum at the same time, with the application of 
each layer to a Memorandum being largely dependent on the identity of its signatories, and its 
subject matter. Let us outline this argument here before we subsequently explain it in depth. 
An analysis of the confidentiality clauses in the Memoranda shows that the first layer of 
obligations consists of primary EU law, including the Protocol n.4 on the Statute of the ESCB 
and of the ECB (hereafter ‘ESCB Statute’). Arguably, these obligations bind the ESCB 
always when the ECB or the NCBs sign a Memorandum that falls within their competences. 
The second layer of obligations derives from secondary EU legislation, such as Directives 
and Regulations when these apply to the MoU, or - more correctly phrased - when these are 
somehow linked with the MoU.92 The third layer of obligations is national legislation 
applicable to the MoU in question. This might be national legislation of the Member State 
where both parties are located / have their seat93, where one party is located94, or even of a 
third country, such as the US in the case of the MoU between the Office of Financial 
Research and the ECB.  
 
To explain our argument, we can consider each layer of obligations separately, coupled with 
relevant examples from MoUs. Looking at each level of obligations together but also one-by-
one helps us map out the legal regime applicable to the parties signing the MoU specifically 
with regard to confidentiality and professional secrecy, and takes us one step closer to 
understanding the legal nature of these instruments. In turn, this mapping out exercise will 
help us identify any issues, problematic aspects or tensions, similarly to what we have done 
previously in this section for the other three types of common clauses found in the 
Memoranda (i.e. disclaimer, context, and settlement clauses). 
 
As we said above, the first layer includes primary EU law, in line with our traditional 
thinking about sources in EU law. ‘Confidentiality’ does not appear as such in the TEU, 
while the TFEU only mentions it in Part Seven (General and Final Provisions), Article 338 
TFEU, in regard to the production of Union statistics which must conform to statistical 
confidentiality. Thus, the reference to confidentiality in the TFEU relates specifically to 
statistics rather than to a generic duty or obligation to maintain confidentiality. In EU legal 
scholarship, confidentiality is often discussed as the opposite practice of openness or 
transparency of EU institutions, which is codified in Article 15 TFEU.95 Without getting into 
the particulars of what is currently becoming in the literature a growing debate on the 
                                                
92 See our discussion above under ‘context clauses’ on the link between some MoUs and secondary legislation. 
93 2016 MoU between Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish Ministries of Finance and Danish Ministry of Business on 
cooperation regarding significant branches of cross-border banking groups. 
94 The 2009 MoU on Target2 specifies that the law applicable to the MoU is that of the seat of the ECB. 
95 A. Alemanno, ‘Unpacking the principle of openness in EU law: transparency, participation and democracy’ 
(2014) 39(1) ELRev 72. 
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transparency of the ECB96, suffice it to say that the ECB has its own confidentiality regime 
by virtue of the ESCB Statute and secondary legislation, which is discussed below. With 
regard to professional secrecy, Article 339 TFEU requires the members of the institutions of 
the Union, and other officials and servants of the EU ‘not to disclose information of the kind 
covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.’  
 
Despite the separate references of the Treaty to the terms ‘confidentiality’ and ‘professional 
secrecy’, the two have been used interchangeably by the CJEU in the field of financial 
supervision. In the case of Altmann, which dealt with the disclosure of information about 
investment firms by a supervisory authority, the obligation to maintain professional secrecy 
was said to cover confidential information.97 In a more recent case, AG Bot opined that there 
is an overlap between confidentiality and professional secrecy and that ‘the use of those two 
terms must be regarded as redundant, in as much as they in reality denote a single purpose 
and the same idea.’98  
 
The Statute of the ESCB provides some additional information on confidentiality and 
professional secrecy obligations in Articles 37 and 5. The former provides that members of 
the governing bodies and the staff of the ECB shall not disclose information of the kind 
covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. This prohibition extends to members of the 
governing bodies and the staff of the NCBs. Article 5 concerns the collection of statistical 
information and provides that, for this purpose, the ECB must cooperate with several actors. 
Article 5(4) mandates the Council to define the applicable confidentiality regime and the 
appropriate provisions for enforcement. Given the position of Article 5(4) in the text of the 
Statute, we can assume that the ‘confidentiality regime’ refers here specifically to statistical 
information rather than information handled by the ECB more generally speaking.  
 
All these primary law provisions clearly apply to the ECB as an EU institution, persons 
working for the ECB, and - when it comes to the ESCB Statute - the 28 national central banks 
which are part of the ESCB.99 When the MoUs refer to confidentiality and professional 
secrecy requirements, however, they do not necessarily distinguish between obligations that 
apply to the EU and those that apply to signatories coming from Member States, such as 
national authorities other than NCBs. For example, the 2008 MoU on cross-border financial 
stability concluded between the Financial Supervisory Authorities, Finance Ministries and 
other authorities, NCBs, and the ECB states that ‘the Parties shall ensure that all persons 
dealing with, or having access to, such [confidential] information are bound by the obligation 
                                                
96 For recent literature see D. Curtin, ‘‘Accountable Independence’ of the European Central Bank: Seeing the 
Logics of Transparency’ (2017) 23(1) European Law Journal 28; F. Coman-Kund, A. Karatzia, and F. 
Amtenbrink, ‘The transparency of the European Central Bank in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (2018) 
51(1) Kredit und Kapital 55. 
97 Case C-140/13 Altmann v Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht paras 28-35; Case C-15/16 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht v Ewald Baumeister [2014 ]ECLI:EU:C:2014:2362 paras 22, 
46, 48. 
98 Opinion of AG Bot in Case C-15/16 Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht v Ewald Baumeister 
[2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:464 para 55. 
99 Article 131 TFEU; Article 14 of the ESCB Statute.  
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of professional secrecy’ (clause 8.3).100 Where does this obligation originate from with regard 
to the parties to the Memorandum that are not the ECB or EU bodies? Is it possible for an 
MoU on its own to create confidentiality obligations for Member States exchanging 
information, which do not exist in EU law or their national laws at the time of the signature 
of the MoU? Even with regard to the EU actors in an MoU, what obligations exactly does 
professional secrecy impose on them? 
 
These questions can be potentially tackled by looking into the other two layers of obligations. 
The second layer of obligations derives from secondary EU law apposite to the MoUs. We 
can see that secondary legislation often operates as a ‘gap-filler’, furnishing the details as to 
the confidentiality and professional secrecy obligations of the signatories. One legal act 
applies as an umbrella to all the MoUs signed by the ECB: the ECB Decision 2004/2 on the 
ECB Rules of Procedure101, which inter alia sets out the confidentiality regime of the ECB. 
Article 23 and 23a of the Decision map the confidentiality requirements that apply to the 
ECB in the fulfillment of its tasks, including those of financial supervision. There is no 
apparent reason why this confidentiality regime would not apply to the ECB when signing an 
MoU or acting under an MoU.  
 
Other secondary legislation connected to MoUs is not the same throughout the dataset of 
Memoranda. As we have previously discussed, a number of MoUs are connected to 
Regulations or Directives, depending on their subject matter. Interestingly, with regard to the 
publicly available MoUs that contain confidentiality clauses, only the five MoUs that were 
signed after 2012 are directly linked with EU secondary legislation.102 Each of the secondary 
legislation instruments linked with each of these five MoUs provides rules on confidentiality 
and/or professional secrecy. Where this secondary legislation is mentioned in the MoU, it sets 
out requirements not only for the ECB, but also for the other signatory/-ies of the 
Memorandum.  
 
For example, the 2013 MoU between the Council and the ECB on the SSM is clearly rooted 
in the SSM Regulation which specifies that the reporting obligations of the ECB towards the 
Council and the Euro Group should be subject to the professional secrecy requirements set 
out in the ESCB statute and EU law.103 The 2015 MoU between the SRB and the ECB and its 
revised 2018 version refer to ‘relevant Union law’ and make reference in its Preamble to the 
SSM Regulation and the SRM Regulation.104 We outlined previously the obligations deriving 
from the SSM Regulation.105 The SRM Regulation also contains specific confidentiality and 
                                                
100 See also the 2016 MoU with Nordic countries on the prudential supervision of significant branches, clause 
48, which states that “The Participants will ensure that all persons dealing with, or having access to, such 
confidential information, are bound by the obligations of professional secrecy in accordance with the applicable 
Union law.  
101 Decision of the ECB of 19 February 2004 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the ECB (ECB/2004/2), (2004) 
OJ L 80 as amended. 
102 See in Annex II the five MoUs signed after 2013. We can exclude from our discussion the 2016 MoU on 
cross-border supervision which does not include the ECB as a signatory.  
103 Recitals 55 and 74, and Article 27(1) of the Regulation. 
104 2018 MoU para. 13 
105 Need to cross-reference 
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professional secrecy requirements.106 By referring to both of these Regulations, the MoU 
ensures that both parties are covered in terms of confidentiality obligations. The SSM 
Regulation is also mentioned in the 2016 MoU between the ECB and authorities of Nordic 
countries on prudential supervision of significant branches. Other relevant EU law which 
establishes confidentiality requirements in the context of the 2015 MoU (as revised in 
2018)107 includes the Capital Requirements Directive108 and the Banking Recovery and 
Resolution Directive.109 Each of these Directives covers confidentiality obligations which 
apply both to the ECB (in the context of banking supervision)110 and to national authorities, 
bodies, and individuals, acting under the Directives and thus, arguably, also when acting 
under the MoU.111 Lastly, the two remaining public MoUs containing confidentiality 
clauses112 are concerned with the exchange of statistics and hence refer to the relevant, 
detailed, confidentiality regime set out in Council Regulation 2533/98.113 
 
Moving on, the third layer of obligations that may be imposed on the parties upon the 
signature of an MoU consists of national legislation. The 2008 MoU on cross-border financial 
stability, for instance, states that ‘any information exchanged and received by virtue of the 
application of the provisions of this [MoU] is subject to conditions of confidentiality and 
professional secrecy as provided in Community and national legislation.’ A similar clause is 
included in the 2016 MoU on the supervision of significant branches.114 Although subjecting 
the application of the MoU provisions to both EU and national rules creates a double layer of 
protection, what remains unclear is which rules of confidentiality shall prevail in case of inter 
partes dispute. In spite of the fact that one may rush to conclude that EU rules on 
confidentiality would preempt national ones, the degree to which confidentiality is respected 
as a general principle of EU law and specifically in the context of enforcement proceedings is 
unclear. There are no CJEU guidelines, for instance, as to whether in case of dispute a 
national court shall refrain from disapplying an inconsistent national confidentiality provision 
with EU law. The CJEU’s case law is in short supply in this regard and does not provide any 
                                                
106 Recitals 116, 117, Article 88. 
107 Paragraph 48 of the MoU. 
108 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the 
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending 
Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (2013) OJ L 176/338 (Hereafter 
‘CRD IV’). 
109 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council 
Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 
2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (2014) OJ L 173/190 (hereafter ‘BRRD’). 
110 Articles 9 and 27 SSM Regulation. 
111 From the CRD: Recital 29 and Section II (Articles 53 - 62). From the BRRD: Recitals 36, 86, Article 84, esp. 
Article 98 on exchange of confidential information. The link between the MoU and these two Directives is 
apparent from paragraph 8 of the MoU, which states that ‘for the purposes of this [MoU] the terms and 
expressions have the same meaning as in Directives 2013/36/EU and 2014/59/EU, unless stated otherwise’. 
112 The 2013 MoU between the ECB and the European Statistical System, and the 2017 MoU between the ECB 
and the US Office of Financial Research. 
113 Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the collection of statistical 
information by the European Central Bank (1998) OJ L 318/8, as amended, Article 8. 
114 The MoU states ‘Any confidential information will be exchanged in accordance with relevant national and 
Union law.’ 
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answers as to the extent to which national judges shall proceed with an interpretation that is 
in par with a general principle of EU law emanating from the protection of rights under EU 
law which arise from breaches of contractual duties of confidentiality.  
 
By contrast, the wording of the respective MoUs suggests that Member States are allowed to 
lay down their own confidentiality and professional secrecy rules. Their competence to do so, 
however, shall be exercised in a way which is commensurate with their membership 
obligations in light of their duty of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU. The CJEU 
has traditionally emphasised the Member States’ duty of loyal cooperation - i.e. if the 
situation is covered by the material scope of EU law, Member States ought to exercise their 
competences in accordance with EU law.115 This means in effect that the rules on 
confidentiality and professional secrecy as provided by EU law may supersede national 
legislation on the same issue in the Member States if the effectiveness of EU law is at stake. 
The case will of course be different where reference to national legislation on confidentiality 
concerns the law of a third country (see for e.g. the MoU between the ECB and the US Office 
for Financial Information). In any case, professional secrecy in banking supervision at the 
national level is largely harmonised through the Credit Requirements Directive (CRD IV) and 
the BRRD, as explained above. Moreover, in this field the ECB also has to apply relevant 
national law according to Art 4 (3)(3) of the SSM Regulation. Thus, national confidentiality 
provisions transposing the CRD and the BRRD into national law may be conceived also as 
provisions to be applied by the ECB. 
 
The discussion so far is telling in that, in certain instances, there is a whole scope of legal acts 
behind a Memorandum, which give teeth to the MoU’s confidentiality and professional 
secrecy clauses. The analysis also leads to a question which looms over the discussion 
regarding confidentiality clauses in MoUs: what happens with the MoUs that are not 
supported by a secondary act? Is it necessary to have a scaffolding of secondary law behind 
the MoU for a confidentiality clause to ‘bite’? Or are the provisions of the MoU on their own 
sufficient to create a regime that protects the confidentiality of the information exchanged 
between the signatories? These considerations are pertinent to understanding the legal nature 
of the MoUs but also for the purposes of legal clarity and legal certainty. Lack of precision as 
to the obligations of the parties and the scope of these obligations might lead to uncertainty 
among the parties, especially about the consequences that may follow a breach of these 
obligations.  
 
Against the above background, the coexistence of confidentiality clauses and ‘disclaimer 
clauses’ is particularly noteworthy and, we might even say, slightly puzzling. If a document 
contains a confidentiality clause, like the ones mentioned above, but it simultaneously 
contains a ‘disclaimer clause’ refuting the legally binding nature of the document, what 
guarantees to each signatory that confidentiality will be maintained by the other party? 
                                                
115 See for instance: C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] ECR 1-4239; Opinion of A.G. Maduro in C-135/08 Rottmann 
[2010] ECR I-1449; C-446/03 Marks & Spencer Plc [2005] ECR I-10837; C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR 
I-11613; C-192/05 Tas Hagen [2006] ECR I-10451. See also on the duty of sincere cooperation: G. De Baere 
and T. Roes, ‘EU loyalty as good faith’ (2015) 64 (4) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 829. 
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Ultimately, what obliges the signatories to comply with their confidentiality or professional 
secrecy obligations under the Memorandum if there is no enforcement mechanism in place? 
What happens in case a party breaches its obligations in this respect? 
 
These reflections take us to a broader question which can be asked about the MoUs which 
include any of the above types of disclaimer, context, settlement, and confidentiality clauses: 
to what extent are these clauses capable of achieving their objectives? As seen above, the 
phrasing used in the Memoranda with regard to their legal nature often conflates ‘intention’ 
with ‘effects’, by implying that: because the parties do not intend to create any legally 
enforceable rights by signing the MoU, the document is not legally binding. Yet, it is worth 
asking whether the one (intention) necessarily determines the other (effects) and whether a 
clause is sufficient to dispose of any legally binding effect of a document - in our case of a 
Memorandum. These reflections take us to another query, i.e. whether the nature of the 
Memoranda may inhibit the achievement of their objectives as a whole, regardless of whether 
we are talking about the exchange of statistics or the cooperation on banking supervision 
between the ECB and third actors.  
 
III. An Analytical Framework for the use of MoUs by the ECB 
 
Our discussion so far has, perhaps, raised more questions on the subject of the use of MoUs 
by the ECB than expected by the reader. Bringing together the above theoretical discussion 
and empirical exploration, this section will attempt to create a typology of issues that arise in 
the existing MoUs and that may arise in the future practice of the ECB - and, potentially, of 
other institutions - with these instruments.  
 
To begin with, we can summarise the four areas discussed in Section II where issues arise 
and are likely to arise in the future with the use of MoUs by the ECB. The first is the MoUs’ 
attempt to stipulate their legal nature, which leads to a consideration of whether the 
signatories can effectively repudiate any legal effects that may result from signing a 
Memorandum. The second matter deals with the position of the MoUs in the existing legal 
framework and provokes questions as to the differences between Memoranda that are rooted 
in secondary legislation and those that are not. The third concerns the way in which the 
parties solve any disagreements that may arise under the Memorandum. Finally, the fourth 
area of concern is the use of confidentiality and professional secrecy clauses in almost all the 
publicly available MoUs, which brings into question the effectiveness of these clauses given 
the uncertain enforceability of the MoUs.  
 
These four areas are the pillars of our proposed analytical framework; any attempt to sketch 
the framework needs to tackle the most pertinent questions that arise from these areas. The 
lack of case law and the scarce literature on the status of MoUs in EU law - discussed in Part 
I - do not assist our task as they deprive us from any solid lessons that could have been drawn 
from these sources. Two recent AG Opinions, however, are of particular interest. The first is, 
AG Sharpston’s Opinion in Case C-660/13 and the second is AG Bobek’s Opinion in Case C-
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16/16.116 One might argue that we should be wary of relying too heavily on these two 
Opinions, which were not strictly speaking referring to MoUs signed by the ECB and were 
not followed per se by the ECJ in its respective rulings. Nevertheless, we find that the 
reasonings behind the Opinions go to the heart of one of the central concerns of our paper, 
namely whether an act perceived as non-binding by its parties can still have (binding) legal 
effects.  
 
Given the lack of any concrete rulings by the CJEU on the subject of the binding nature of 
MoUs, and since the ECJ in the two cases above (C-660/13 and C-16/16) did not expressly or 
entirely dismiss the opinions of the Advocate Generals on the particular topics, we can utilise 
these reasonings as focal points in setting our analytical framework. What makes the 
Opinions particularly compelling in the context of the current paper is that each Advocate 
General deals with two separate types of acts / instruments, both of which are relevant to 
MoUs signed by the ECB. AG Bobek discusses the so-called ‘atypical acts of EU 
institutions’ while AG Sharpston focuses on MoUs signed by the Commission with a third 
country. As we will see below, both these types of instruments bear resemblance and are 
relevant to the MoUs signed by the ECB. This observation illustrates once again the fluid 
nature of these Memoranda.  
 
Sharpston’s Opinion is targeted at the admissibility of MoUs in a challenge under Article 263 
TFEU. The Advocate General engages with the question of whether an MoU between the 
Commission and Switzerland, and its subsequent addenda, might have legal effects or 
consequences despite both parties having expressed their intention not to be bound by them 
as a matter of international law. She considers this question as something that must be 
clarified in order to decide on the admissibility of the case before the CJEU under Article 263 
TFEU, given that Article 263 TFEU provides for the Court to review the legality of acts of 
the Commission (other than recommendations and opinions) intended to produce legal effects 
vis-à-vis third parties.  
 
As she explains, what matters in proving the binding effect of an agreement ‘depends on the 
parties’ intention to be bound by it as a matter of international law’. To establish that 
intention, one has to look into the actual terms of the agreement and the circumstances in 
which it was drawn up. The name and form of the agreement are not decisive in establishing 
whether an international agreement is non-binding. In deciding whether parties intended to be 
bound by their signatures, consideration must be given to the terminology of the agreement: 
were the terms used expressing intent (e.g. using verbs such as ‘intent to’, ‘accept to’) or 
obligation (‘shall’, ‘must’, ‘undertake’)? Did the MoU contain clauses that brought them 
closer to binding than non-binding agreements, such as clauses regarding their entry into 
force, ratification, registration or deposition elsewhere, or the settlement of disputes? In the 
case at hand, even though the MoU in question contained a disclaimer that the parties did not 
intent to create any binding or legal obligations on either side under domestic and 
                                                
116 AG Sharpston Opinion in Case C-660/13 Council of the EU v Commission [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:787; AG 
Bobek Opinion in Case C-16/16 Belgium v Commission [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:959. 
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international law, Sharpston still opined that the agreement in question produced legal effects 
and could be reviewed under Article 263 TFEU. 
 
One must be careful when drawing parallelisms between case law concerning similar matters 
but different institutions. One of the tenets of Sharpston’s argument was that the Commission 
had signed the addendum to the MoU in question on behalf of the European Union. The ECB 
does not hold the same role of the ‘guardian of the Treaties’ or that of ‘the face of the EU in 
external relations’ as the Commission does. Specifically, Article 17(1) TEU provides that 
‘with the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and other cases provided for 
in the Treaties, it [the Commission] shall ensure the Union’s external representation.’ 
Conversely, it is difficult to argue that, when signing an MoU, the ECB is representing the 
Union as a whole and not itself as an institution. It is also relevant here that, at least in the 
field of financial supervision, secondary legislation stipulates that the ECB may ‘develop 
contacts and enter into administrative arrangements with supervisory authorities, international 
organisations and the administrations of third countries’ and that ‘those arrangements shall 
not create legal obligations in respect of the Union and its Member States’.117 
 
Even so, the AG’s guidance, set out above, on the factors that are taken into consideration by 
the CJEU when looking into the legal effects of an allegedly non-binding instrument should 
also inform the practice of the ECB when drafting Memoranda. The same can be said about 
lessons drawn from case law regarding the test to determine legal effects for acts that are not 
MoUs. In this respect, we can highlight the CJEU’s ‘legal effects’ test, according to which a 
measure adopted by an EU institution is reviewable by the CJEU under Article 263 TFEU 
when it is intended to have binding legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the 
applicants by bringing about a distinct change in the applicant’s legal position.118 In order to 
determine whether a measure produces such legal effects, the CJEU will look into its subject 
matter, content, and substance, as well as its factual and legal context.119  
 
It is therefore apparent that the test to determine legal effect consists of a combination of 
factors. The intention of the parties is one of these factors but it does not necessarily seem to 
be the determining one. What is more, a word of warning must be given here about the 
emphasis that should be placed on the intentions of the drafters of an act, either that act is an 
MoU or any type of ‘atypical act’ that is not defined in the Treaties.120 A loophole might be 
created if the legal nature of an act is judged predominantly on the basis of the drafters’ 
intentions at the time when the act was adopted. Let us assume that the ECB had no intention 
of drafting a binding measure (e.g. a Regulation on banking supervision) to achieve a specific 
purpose. For this reason, it selected to draft an MoU instead. Because the ECB selected an 
MoU, its intent was for that instrument not to be binding. Because of this intent, which was 
validated by the choice of the instrument, the said instrument (in our case an MoU) can never 
be binding, irrespective of its content and wording, because the ECB did not intent to adopt 
                                                
117 SSM Regulation Article 8. 
118 Case 60/81 IBM v Commission EU:C:1981:264 para 9. 
119 Case T-573/10, Octapharma Pharmazeutika v EMA, not published. 
120 Commission v Council (22/70 EU:C:1971:32 (hereafter ‘ERTA judgment’). 
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any binding measures when it was adopting it.121 In this way, the drafters risk pre-
determining the context and purpose of an MoU as a result of choosing to act via an MoU in 
the first place. Placing an excessive attention on ‘intention’ as opposed also to ‘content’ and 
‘wording’ might run the risk of creating this loophole. 
 
There also seems to be a general confusion arising out of the CJEU’s jurisprudence as to 
whether an act which has ‘legal effects’ is also ‘binding’ or whether the two are separate 
characteristics of an act that need to be shown for an action challenging that act to be 
admissible under Article 263 TFEU. AG Bobek’s Opinion aptly illustrates this obscurity and 
offers some constructive thoughts on the distinction between ‘bindingness’ and ‘legal 
effects’. The Advocate General explains that the test to determine the admissibility of a claim 
challenging an ‘atypical act’ under Article 263 TFEU has been modified by the CJEU 
throughout the years. What started in ERTA as a requirement to show that the act was 
intended to have ‘legal effects’ has turned into a requirement to show that the act has ‘binding 
legal effects’, which is a more narrow test than the original criterion and implies a more 
narrow category of acts than those which have legal effect. Binding force implies that the act 
in question is coupled with enforcement and sanction mechanisms. By way of contrast, ‘legal 
effects’ connote acts that impact on the legal situation of their addresses or on their rights and 
obligations.122 As a result of the confusing approach of the CJEU in its relevant case law,123 
one might be tempted to think that ‘binding’, ‘mandatory’, or ‘having legal effects’ are 
synonymous or identical characteristics of an EU act and by extension of MoUs signed by 
EU institutions or bodies.  Yet, in reality, an act may be carrying legal effects without being 
binding on its parties.124  
 
Based on the above considerations, on the one hand it is not implausible that a measure which 
was not intended to be binding by the EU institution that adopted it is found by the CJEU to 
have legal effects.125  On the other hand, we do not expect a flood of litigation to arise under 
Article 263 TFEU vis-a-vis the MoUs signed by the ECB, mainly because of one big 
difference between these MoUs and measures that were adopted by an EU institution whose 
legal effects have been doubted in the past. Contrary to the latter, which are addressed by the 
institution to the respective addressee(s) (e.g. a Commission Recommendation), the former 
are primarily bilateral and express a common position of the parties to follow a stipulated 
course of action.  
 
                                                
121 This argument is taken from AG Bobek’s Opinion in Case C-16/16, where he discussed the same loophole 
with regard to a Commission Recommendation in paras 78-79. AG Bobek Opinion in Case C-16/16 Belgium v 
Commission [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:959. 
122 AG Bobek Opinion in Case C-16/16 Belgium v Commission [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:959 paras 73,74,87, 
109. 
123 AG Bobek Opinion in Case C-16/16 Belgium v Commission [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:959 paras 59-66. 
124 AG Bobek Opinion in Case C-16/16 Belgium v Commission [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:959 para 113. 
125 See recent decision in Case T-561/14 One of Us v Commission [2018] ECLI:EU:T:2018:210 where the Court 
found that a Commission’s Communication had legal effects. The Commission had argued that the 
Communication, due to its form and nature, was not intended to produce binding legal effects and that it was an 
act of the Commission which reflects the latter’s intention of following a particular line of conduct, such acts not 
having to be regarded as being intended to produce legal effects. 
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Nonetheless, whether it is realistic or not to expect litigation under Article 263 TFEU should 
not necessarily be the first consideration in the minds of the drafters of MoUs when they put 
together MoUs. In a Union based on the rule of law, EU institutions should comply with their 
legal obligations and should respect the confines of their powers irrespective of how little 
chance there might be for litigation. Moreover, in case of disagreements between the 
signatories, is more likely that informal dispute settlement mechanisms will be preferred, 
even for those MoUs that do not stipulate this in their text. We accept, for instance, that if one 
party does not oblige to its obligations under the MoU (e.g. with confidentiality 
requirements) there might be policy / reputational considerations, or peer pressure by the 
other party which itself might even stop cooperating in response. Indeed, it is likely that 
disputes under MoUs have been resolved in this way so far. If worse comes to worse and 
there is no way to settle the differences between the signatories, the MoU will likely get 
renegotiated or abandoned.  
 
However, the fact that there has not been litigation so far on our subject of analysis should 
not be seen as the norm for the future. We have observed earlier that MoUs are being signed 
for the first time by the ECB in the context of the Banking Union, and that MoUs have 
recently (i.e. after 2012 for the publicly available Memoranda) started being directly linked 
with secondary legislation. Both of these developments are relevant in considering the future 
of MoUs. The expansion of MoUs into the area of Banking Union will likely highlight even 
more the need for confidentiality on behalf of the ECB and the respective signatories in each 
MoU. Information is to be exchanged between the ECB and national or EU actors in the field 
of banking supervision, including that on the performance of large branches of credit 
institutions, supervisors’ liquidity reports and recovery plans,126 (group) resolution plans, as 
well as information collected on an institution subject to a “‘failing or likely to fail’ 
assessment”.127 Those credit institutions may seek to challenge the basis on which such 
information is exchanged.128 As we argued in the first section of this article, regardless of the 
legal effects of an MoU, signatories or third parties should not have problems with 
admissibility if they wish to seek damages under Article 340 TFEU. 
 
Moreover, cases might arise under Article 267 TFEU, similarly to how an ECB Press 
Release129 and an MoU on balance-of-payments assistance130 found their way before the 
CJEU in the past. In a recent case, the investors of a company that was dissolved sought 
access to information about the company, which was confidential under the 2004 Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive.131 The national supervisory authorities refused access to that 
information.132 Along similar lines as this case and in light of the increased need for 
                                                
126 2016 MoU between Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and the ECB on prudential supervision. 
127 2015 SRB - ECB MoU as revised in 2018. 
128 For a recent case on confidentiality requirements under Article 53(1) of the CRV IV see Case C-594/16 
Buccioni [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:717. 
129 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:400. 
130 Case C-258/14 Florescu v Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Sibiu, [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:448 
131 Case C-15/16 Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht v Ewald Baumeister [2018] 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:464. 
132 Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments (2004) OJ L 145/1. 
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confidentiality sketched above, we can think of the situation where a significant financial 
institution based in a Eurozone Member State (ie member of the Banking Union) is resolved 
and investors of that institution are seeking access to information exchanged between the 
ECB (as the supervisor of the institution) and the SRB under the SRM Regulation read 
together with the 2018 MoU on cooperation and information exchange between the two 
institutions. It is not improbable that this scenario could lead to a preliminary reference 
request from a national court. 
 
Considerations over confidentiality obligations also extend beyond the potential for litigation 
against the ECB. If we flip our point of view, the ECB itself may have reasons to be 
concerned about the situation where the other party/ies to a Memorandum do not follow the 
confidentiality requirements that are applicable to them. Situations whereby confidentiality 
requirements are not complied with may jeopardise not only the data exchanged between the 
signatories, but also the effectiveness of the Memorandum in achieving its objectives and 
potentially the objectives of any underlying EU legislation. In this respect, it might be useful 
to refer to the discussion in Section II on how different parties to a Memorandum are bound 
by confidentiality obligations. 
 
The potential for non-compliance with the confidentiality regime applying to MoUs is also 
connected with the second development identified above, namely the link between an MoU 
and secondary legislation. We can argue that an MoU which is directly linked to a Regulation 
or a Directive, especially one that mandates the conclusion of the Memorandum, should be 
interpreted differently from other MoUs that were adopted on the initiative of the signatories. 
This distinction is based on the fact that the former type of MoUs can be considered as an 
extension of the secondary legislation. These MoUs are bound to increase in number due to 
newly adopted Banking Union legislation that either expressly requires the conclusion of 
MoUs with competent authorities of Member States133 or requires close cooperation between 
the ECB and relevant financial supervision actors.134  
 
The interpretative differences among different Memoranda may lead to a different application 
of the ‘legal effects’ test on MoUs insofar as secondary legislation constitutes part of some 
Memorandum’s legal background and creates obligations for the ECB to adopt them.135 We 
saw previously that the CJEU recently characterised an MoU as an EU act where that MoU 
was directly connected to secondary EU legislation i.e. an EU Regulation and a Council 
Decision which required the adoption of the said MoU.136 We raised then the question of 
whether an MoU would have been heard by the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU if it were not 
connected to these ‘typical acts’. Along similar lines, we can also question whether an MoU 
not directly connected to secondary EU law would have the same treatment by the CJEU as 
an MoU that was signed upon the initiative of the parties.  
                                                
133 SSM Regulation Article 3(1), Article 3(6). 
134 SSM Regulation Article 3, SRM Regulation Article 32(2). 
135 On how this obligation could affect the legal effects test, see Case T-561/14 One of Us v Commission [2018] 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:210 paras 66-101. 
136 See discussion in Part I on the CJEU’s treatment of an MoU in the Florescu case. 
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A recent – although unrelated to EMU – case illustrates this consideration with regard to the 
connection between a Commission Communication and Treaty-embedded rights. In the One 
of Us case, a group of individuals challenged a Commission Communication under Article 
263 TFEU. The Communication stated that the Commission would not act upon the 
individuals’ European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). According to the Commission, the 
Communication, due to its form and nature, was not intended to produce binding legal effects 
and that it merely reflected the Commission’s intention of following a particular line of 
conduct. According to the General Court, however, the Communication expressed the refusal 
of the Commission, which affected the citizens’ (substantive) right derived from the Treaty 
(Article 11(4) TEU) and the corresponding procedural guarantees afforded to the organisers 
through the ECI Regulation137 Not submitting the Communication to judicial review would 
compromise the realisation of the Treaty objectives (set out in Article 11(4) TEU. Moreover, 
the procedural guarantees for the organisers expressed in the secondary law instrument (ie the 
ECI Regulation) implied that the communication produced binding legal effects with regard 
to its addressees.   
 
Along these lines, we can argue that it does matter for the purposes of the CJEU’s approach 
whether an MoU is rooted in EU secondary law, and all the more so when this link is traced 
back to rights embedded in the Treaty. In the context of the current paper, these connections 
between Treaty-secondary law-MoUs are relevant insofar as some of the MoUs examined in 
Part II are directly linked to EU Regulations or EU Directives. Beyond the bounds of the 
judicial realm these connections are also relevant when considering the practical obligations 
of the parties to enter into MoUs. Assume here, for a minute, that the ECB concludes an MoU 
with a non-participating Member State under Article 3(6) of the SSM Regulation. This 
Article requires the ECB to do so, rather than merely giving it the option to conclude an 
MoU. Assume now that a disagreement arises under the said MoU because the non-
participating Member State has breached one of the promises they made in the text of the 
MoU. Without a legal enforcement mechanism to solve this disagreement, the parties are 
likely to resort to informal mechanisms, such as peer pressure, as we pointed out earlier in the 
paper. Worst come to worst, we said, the parties will dissolve the MoU. But, in this scenario, 
the MoU is mandated by EU secondary legislation. It is therefore questionable whether the 
ECB would be able to get out of the text of the MoU without being in breach of its 
obligations under the SSM Regulation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Part III of this paper emphasised that, beyond the legalistic considerations over potential 
litigation, there is a bigger, overarching issue to be highlighted regarding the MoUs. As seen 
overall in this paper, the uncertain legal character of the MoUs, which evade blanket 
categorisations, leads to questions of enforcement or, in other words, of how to ensure the 
achievement of an MoU’s goals. We have attempted to shed light on certain areas of concern 
                                                
137 Regulation 211/2011 of 16 February 2011 on the citizens’ initiative (2011) OJ L 65/1. 
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pertaining to the use of MoUs by the ECB and to map a potential analytical framework for 
conceptualising MoUs. Given these concerns, perhaps the ECB, as well as any EU institution, 
should consider on a case-by-case basis whether an MoU is the appropriate instrument to 
achieve the desirable objectives.  
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ANNEX I  
 
List of MoUs signed by, or involving the ECB138 
 
Name of MoU Date of Signature / Entry 
into effect 
Full text 
publicly 
available? 
Source of MoU’s Press Release or full text, 
where available. 
MoU on cooperation between payment systems overseers 
and banking supervisors in stage three of economic and 
monetary union 
2 April 2001 (Entered into 
force retroactively on 1 
January 2001) 
No <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2001/html/pr010
402.en.html > 
MoU on a Code of Conduct for the members of the 
Governing Council139 
May 2002 Yes <www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/c_01020070116
en00060007.pdf > 
MoU between ECB and the People’s Bank of China140 September 2002 No Source of information: ECB Annual Report 2002  
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annrep/ar2001
en.pdf?f0080589f48a3852698504a2d4f79104> 
MoU on Economic and Financial Statistics between the 
ECB (DG Statistics) and the European Commission 
(Eurostat) 
10 March 2003  Yes <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_mou_
with_eurostat1.pdf> 
MoU on high-level principles of cooperation between the 
banking supervisors and central banks of the European 
Union in crisis management situations141 
Entry into effect on 1 
March 2003 
No <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2003/html/pr030
310_3.en.html> 
MoU on the exchange of information among credit 
registers for the benefit of reporting institutions 
10 March 2003 (publication 
of Press Release) 
Yes <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2003/html/pr030
310_2.en.html> 
Full text N/A online 
MoU on co-operation between the Banking Supervisors, 
Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the European 
Union in Financial crisis situations 
18 May 2005 (entered into 
effect on 1 July 2005) 
No <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2005/html/pr050
518_1.en.html> 
MoU on cooperation between the financial supervisory 
authorities, central banks, and finance ministries of the 
European Union on cross-border financial stability 
1 June 2008 Yes <www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/mou-
financialstability2008en.pdf> 
MoU on Target2-Securities 16 July 2009 Yes <www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/pdf/T2S_MoU.pdf?
d21826f32c08559e952f3015b02081af> 
                                                
138 Please note that this is not an exhaustive list of MoUs concluded by the ECB, but only reflects publicly 
available information on concluded MoUs. Press Releases on the majority of these MoUs, including links to the 
full texts of Memoranda (where these are available) are accessible at: 
<www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2018/html/index.en.html>  
139 See the amendments by the 2006 ‘Memorandum of Understanding on the Memorandum of Understanding on 
a Code of Conduct for the members of the Governing Council’, published in the Official Journal (2002) OJ C 
123/9.  
140 According to the 2008 ECB Annual Report this MoU was renewed in 2008.  
141 See also the Press Release on the adherence of the central banks of the new Member States, Bulgaria and 
Romania to this MoU on 1 August 2007. 
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MoU on the Exchange of Information among National 
Central Credit Registers for the purpose of passing it on 
to reporting institutions142 
April 2010 Yes <www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/memoxinccredi
tregisters201004en.pdf > 
Discontinued in 2018. 
MoU between the ECB and the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey 
4 July 2012 No <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120
704.en.html> 
MoU between the ECB and the Bank of Russia 30 October 2012 No <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr121
030_2.en.html> 
MoU between the Council of the European Union and 
the ECB on the cooperation on procedures related to the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
December 2013 Yes <www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/mou_between_e
ucouncil_ecb.pdf> 
MoU on the cooperation between the Members of the 
European Statistical System and the Members of the 
European System of Central Banks 
24 April 2013 Yes <www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/mou_between_t
he_ess_and_the_escb.pdf> 
MoU between the ECB and the Reserve Bank of India 12 January 2015 No <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150
112.en.html> 
MoU on adapting banknote equipment to the new 20 
EUR banknote 
23 July 2015 No <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150
723.en.html > 
MoU between the Single Resolution Board and the ECB 
in respect of cooperation and information exchange143 
22 December 2015 Yes <https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/en_mou_ec
b_srb_cooperation_information_exchange_f_sign_.
pdf > (2015 MoU) 
<https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/mou_with_t
he_single_resolution_board_on_cooperation_and_i
nformation_exchange_2018_.pdf> (Revised 
version, 2018) 
MoU between the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) and the ECB 
8 February 2016 No <www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-
news/esma-national-securities-regulators-and-ecb-
exchange-information > 
MoU between the ECB and Banco Central do Brasil 15 April 2016 No <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/pr160
416.en.html > 
MoU between Eurostat and the ECB/ DG Statistics on 
the quality assurance of statistics underlying the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure 
7 November 2016 Yes <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/10186/77
22897/Final-signed-MoU-ESTAT-ECB.pdf > 
MoU between Finansinspektionen (Sweden), 
Finanstilsynet (Norway), Finanstilsynet (Denmark), 
Finanssivalvonta (Finland) and the ECB on prudential 
2 December 2016 Yes <www.fktk.lv/attachments/article/6409/MoU%20be
tween%20Sweden,%20Norway,%20Denmark,%20
Finland%20and%20the%20ECB%20on%20prudent
                                                
142 This MoU was discontinued in September 2018 upon the mutual understanding of all parties in light of the 
imminent establishment of AnaCredit, a dataset that will provide the information in a harmonised manner across 
all Member States. <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/govcdec/otherdec/2018/html/ecb.gc180928.en.html> 
143 This MoU was revised on 30 May 2018. 
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supervision of significant branches in Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark and Finland144  
ial%20supervision%20of%20significant%20branch
es%20in%20S.pdf> 
MoU between the Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish 
Ministries of Finance and the Danish Ministry of 
Business on cooperation regarding significant branches 
of cross-border banking groups 
9 December 2016 Yes <www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/1d66c88174d4
4d78a87ba618eca17d52/mou.pdf > 
MoU concerning consultation, cooperation and the 
Exchange of Information between the Office of Financial 
Research and the ECB 
30 May 2017 Yes <	www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/MoU_ECB-
OFR_concerning_consultation_cooperation_and_ex
change_of_information_201705.pdf?07efa4b51716
70e76d67191239869afe > 
MoU between the ECB and the South African Reserve 
Bank 
19 March 2018 No <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2018/html/ecb.p
r180319.en.html > 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
144 See also Accession to the MoU of the competent authorities of Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, and Lithuania in 
April 2017. 
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ANNEX II 
 
Publicly available MoUs containing confidentiality clauses145 
  
Signatories of the MoUs containing confidentiality clauses 
 
  
 MoU ECB NCBs National 
Authorities 
EU body  Third-
country body 
Clause referring to 
‘community and national 
legislation’? 
Linked with 
secondary 
legislation? 
1 2008 on cross-
border financial 
stability 
X X X  
(Financial 
Supervisory 
Authorities, 
Finance 
Ministries, other 
ministries) 
 
  Yes 
‘Community and national 
legislation’ 
No, 
Only with Council 
Conclusions 
2 2009 Target2 X X  
(of the 
eurosystem) 
X    No, refers only to ‘the law 
applicable at the seat of the 
ECB’                  
No 
3 2010 on the 
exchange of info 
among national 
central credit 
registers for the 
purpose of 
passing it on to 
reporting 
institutions 
Not a party but will 
store the MoU, the 
Implementation 
Guide, and may be 
consulted in case 
of doubts or 
uncertainties with 
the MoU 
X 
(of Austria, 
Belgium, Czech 
Republic, France, 
Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, 
Romania, and 
Spain) 
   ‘Confidential and 
professional secrecy 
provisions applicable to the 
supervisory authority in the 
Party’s country shall govern 
such use of information. 
No 
4 2013 with the 
Council on the 
SSM 
X   X 
(Council of 
the European 
Union) 
  Yes, 
Regulation 
1024/2013, see 
specifically for 
confidentiality etc, 
Recital 55, 74, 
Article 27(1) 
 
5 2013 with the 
European 
Statistical 
System 
X 
(MoU refers to the 
ESCB) 
X  
(MoU refers to 
the ESCB) 
X 
(National 
statistical institutes 
(NSIs) and other 
national 
X 
(Commission 
– Eurostat. 
MoU refers 
to the 
X 
(European 
Statistical 
System 
includes EEA 
Confidentiality rules are set 
out in Article 8a of 
Regulation 2533/98, which 
sets out a full and detailed 
confidentiality regime 
Yes, Article 8(a) 
Regulation 
2533/98. 
                                                
145 The list reflects information only about n those MoUs whose full text is publicly available online. 
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authorities. MoU 
refers to the 
Members of the 
European 
Statistical System) 
Members of 
the European 
Statistical 
System) 
and EFTA 
countries: 
Iceland, 
Norway, 
Switzerland,  
Liechtenstein) 
 
6 2015 with the 
SRB (revised in 
2018) 
X   X 
(Single 
Resolution 
Board, which 
is an EU 
agency) 
 
  Yes,  
SRM Regulation 
7 2016 between 
the Finnish, 
Norwegian and 
Swedish 
Ministries of 
Finance and the 
Danish Ministry 
of Business 
Not a signatory, 
but affected by this 
MoU due to its 
supervisory tasks. 
 X  
(Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden) 
 X 
(Norway: Seen 
in the MoU 
together with 
the other three 
countries as 
‘the Nordic 
countries’) 
  
8 2016 with 
Finnish, 
Norwegian, 
Swedish, and 
Danish 
authorities on 
prudential 
supervision of 
significant 
branches 
X  X 
(Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden) 
 X 
(Norway) 
Yes, 
Any confidential 
information will be 
exchanged in accordance 
with relevant national and 
Union law. 
The participants will ensure 
that all persons dealing 
with, or having access to, 
confidential information, 
are bound by the 
obligations of professional 
secrecy in accordance with 
the applicable Union law. 
-Maybe see the CRD? 
 
Yes,  
Directive 
2013/36/EU 
(Capital 
Requirements 
Directive) 
And 
Directive 
2014/59/EU 
And  
Regulation 
1024/2013 
9 2017 
With the Office 
of Financial 
Research 
X    X 
US Office of 
Financial 
Research 
 Yes,  
Article 5 of the 
ESCB Statute 
 
Article 37 of the 
ESCB statute and 
of the ECB 
 
Council 
Regulation 
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2533/98 on the 
collection of 
statistical 
information by the 
ECB as amended 
in 2015 
 
Guidelines of the 
ECB of 12 
December 1998 
on the common 
rules and 
minimum 
standards to 
protect the 
confidentiality of 
the individual 
statistical 
information 
collected by the 
ECB 
(ECB/1998/NP28) 
 
